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PlatoTheaetetus
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Chapters 16-20Chapter Summaries & Analyses
Chapter 16 Summary: “Criticism of Protagoras”
This chapter contains a critical objection to the defense of Protagoras given in Chapter 15. Socrates argues that if we assert that a claim is wise to the extent that it promotes beneficial and healthy states, as opposed to unhealthy ones, then this must involve the use of judgment. In other words, there must be a judgment made “about what’s healthy and unhealthy” (49). Yet, as Socrates also argues, “not every creature knows what’s healthy for itself and is capable of curing itself” (49).
Further, there seems to be a dilemma once such judgments are introduced. On one hand, Protagoras must accept that there is an independent criterion for determining whether judgments about what is healthy are true that does not appeal to healthiness itself. However, this would mean abandoning his theory of knowledge. This is because such a criterion would bring back an objective standard of truth to determine what is healthy, one that bypasses the perception of the individual. Alternatively, though, maintaining that each of our judgments is true for us, or still true relatively, invites paradox. This is the case since the claim that “truth is relative,” or that “there is no objective truth,” would itself have to be a universal and objective truth about the world, and this is self-contradictory.
Chapter 17 Summary: “Philosophy and Rhetoric”
Noting that they still have lots of time, Socrates and Theodorus engage in a lengthy digression about the nature of the philosopher. Specifically, they discuss how the philosopher differs from both “the masses” and from lawyers. Taking the latter first, Socrates says that in comparing lawyers with philosophers, “it’s as if you were comparing the upbringing of slaves with that of free men” (50). This is because lawyers are not masters of what they think or say. While the philosopher can pursue any topic and let his reason guide him to any conclusion, the lawyer is constrained. What he is arguing about, how he argues, and the conclusion he reaches, are determined by another. In a sense, he is a slave to the argument he constructs and to the position he is defending.
The nature of the philosopher is to be unconcerned with immediate self-interest or self-advancement. Socrates tell the story of Thales in connection with this point. Thales was a philosopher so preoccupied with astronomy, and gazing upward, that he fell into a well. It is in this way that the philosopher appears foolish to ordinary people. However, Socrates also emphasizes that the philosopher pursues an enlightened and higher form of self-interest. This is because in escaping the world of ordinary concerns through wisdom, the philosopher becomes as “nearly as possible like a god” (55) and “supremely happy” (56). In contrast, the common man ends up unhappy because his life is devoid of wisdom or virtue.
Chapter 18 Summary: “Further Criticism of Protagoras”
Socrates launches another criticism of Protagoras linked to the issue of judgment raised in Chapter 16, this time focusing on the question of laws made by the state and their justness or usefulness. He points out that “[w]hat’s useful is surely something to do with the future” (57). Whether a law turns out to be useful or harmful can only be fully determined by assessing its effects at some future moment in time. This means the judgment of an individual or state can be fallible. A leader might, for example, believe that it is beneficial to participate in a certain war. Yet after the conflict it can become clear that its effect was overall harmful. In that case, it appears that the individual or state’s present belief regarding the war can be false.
Socrates elaborates on this point to discuss the question of expertise. He argues that a trained cook will be a better judge of the future quality of a meal than an untrained one. He also says that a trained orator will be a better judge of the potential outcome of a trial than someone unfamiliar with oratory.
Chapter 19 Summary: “Theory of Flux”
Socrates concedes that a more limited version of Protagoras’s view could still be true despite the criticism levelled at it in Chapter 18. This would be the case if it restricted its claim that knowledge equals perception to the immediate moment of perception. As such, to fully refute Protagoras, Socrates must contest the “everything is change” theory that underpins Protagoras’s argument. To do this, he examines the concept and its opposite—that everything is whole and unchanging—more closely.
Chapter 20 Summary: “Flux Theory Criticised”
According to the theory that everything changes, there are two types of change: alteration and movement. That is, things can change in relation to their position and according to their nature. For instance, something can move forward and change its color. Further, the adherent of the flux theory is committed to both types of change occurring constantly. However, Socrates argues that if this is the case, then nothing is ever one definite thing. It does not make sense to say that an object has a definitive color, taste, or smell, such as red and smoky, since these qualities are always changing. If this is the case, though, it becomes impossible to give a stable, intelligible account of any perception. And if this is true, then perception cannot yield any intelligible knowledge.
Chapters 16-20 Analysis
In Chapter 16 Socrates attacks the pragmatic theory of wisdom, the idea that wisdom resides in promoting what is beneficial rather than deeper knowledge. He then moves on to what he calls a “digression” about the nature of the philosopher. This is an extensive discussion of how “freedom and leisure” (54) is a necessary condition for the philosopher’s way of thinking and being. It also explores how others are unfree and unthinking precisely because, consumed by business, they lack such otium. Yet how important are these passages? Though they influenced Friedrich Nietzsche’s and Theodor Adorno’s concepts of free time and leisure, it would be easy to dismiss them as incidental or peripheral. Especially given Socrates’s own description of them as a digression, it would be easy to regard these passages as an intriguing but ultimately disconnected and nonessential aspect of Theaetetus.
However, this would be to ignore their connection to broader themes. While not adding to the text’s technical arguments, these passages are crucial for understanding both Socrates’s death, which frames the work, and the Socratic method by which the arguments are formed. Both points are related. The death of Socrates, who was the archetypal philosopher for Plato, was essentially connected to his love for and promotion of leisure. To explain why and better understand what exactly is meant here by “leisure,” it is helpful to look at the antithesis of leisure. For Socrates, this is epitomized by the figure of the lawyer. As he says, they “are always short of time when they speak, because they’re hurried on by the clock” (50). It is not just that they rarely have free time in a literal sense, but that they are “running a race for life itself” (50). They are constantly working toward some preestablished, instrumental goal. On a more localized level this goal may be writing a compelling speech and winning a case. At a broader level it is likely to be achieving career advancement and greater wealth or social status.
In contrast, the leisured philosopher has no specific aim. He thinks and debates without worrying about the purpose of it or how it will benefit him in terms of socially sanctioned goods. Such leisure (or otium) differs from our modern conception of free time. The nature of this otium is not a definite block of time in which to relax or do nothing, or to allow recuperation from the rigors of work. Rather, it is a way of life, pursued actively and continually in contemplation, and for its own sake, free from utilitarian demands.
Yet for the reasons outlined, one who lives that life appears useless. As Socrates says, the philosopher “seems simple-minded and worthless when he gets involved in slave-like tasks” like sweetening a dish or making “an obsequious speech” (54). The lawyer’s or the merchant’s busyness in service of socially accepted ends, such as wealth, is immediately useful to the state. By contrast, the philosopher, with his leisure, seems to produce nothing. Unlike the sophists, they do not even provide entertaining or clever speeches.
This would be bad enough, but the philosopher’s leisure has another consequence. Leisure allows thought to take its own paths, unshackled by instrumental goals. This often leads to the criticism of established goals and values, like wealth or power. Indeed, as in Socrates’s case, it may lead one to challenge the very logic and idea of instrumental goals in the first place. As Socrates says of kings, “lack of leisure is bound to make a man of that kind no less boorish and uneducated than herdsmen” (53). In other words, rulers who believe they tower above ordinary people are, with this, reduced to the status of shepherds. According to this logic, they also pursue instrumental goals just as unthinkingly, and slavishly, as the lowest servant. It is no surprise that such beliefs would irritate social elites; those in power would have quickly seen the philosopher’s leisure as unprofitable to the existing order and as a menace to it, especially if this leisure and otium were being actively promoted among the youth. This is a key reason why Socrates was eventually tried for impiety and corrupting the youth. It is also why the supposed “digression” on the philosopher’s nature has deep significance for Plato.
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