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49 pages 1 hour read

Michael J. Sandel

The Tyranny of Merit: What’s Become of the Common Good?

Nonfiction | Book | Adult | Published in 2020

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Chapters 3-4Chapter Summaries & Analyses

Chapter 3 Summary: The Rhetoric of Rising

A meritocratic system completely discourages a sense of community and belonging: “The more we view ourselves as self-made and self-sufficient, the less likely we are to care for the fate of those less fortunate than ourselves” (59). What is more, success is seen to be completely of the self, while the failure of others is very clearly their own fault. Meritocracy is “corrosive of commonality” (59). In the past few decades, especially in the realm of higher education, students have increasingly become convinced that their success is due to their own efforts alone—this is not a surprise considering the gauntlet of hoops and obstacles that must be jumped through in order to gain admission to even a halfway decent college.

Remuneration in the marketplace too gives this impression, as the idea that one’s wage is a matter purely of what is earned is an unchallenged assumption. What goes largely ignored is the question of what binds a community together. “Through much of the twentieth century,” for instance, “arguments over the welfare state were arguments about solidarity, about what we owe one another as citizens” (64). Questions of responsibility used to be at the forefront of political discourse, but they have faded lately. In discussions of welfare and state-sponsored assistance, the argument used to be—and still largely is—that assistance should be doled out according to need, prioritized in such a manner as to give the most help to those whose circumstances are outside their control.

Here, we have the twin concepts of the “rhetoric of responsibility and the rhetoric of rising” (65) that were the prime modes of conceiving of participation in the American Dream. Both these concepts contributed to the concretization of meritocracy: “both gestured toward the ideal of self-reliance and self-making […] If opportunities were equal, people would rise based on their efforts and talents, and their success would be the measure of their merit” (65, emphasis added). These concepts have been prevalent in American society for quite some time, and have been the favorite talking points of many US presidents. Barack Obama, for instance, used the rhetoric of rising and complementary language more than any other president in American history on account of its ability to inspire citizens from all backgrounds. Employing the language of rising was a direct attempt at emphasizing policies of non-discrimination.

When this language is employed, it directly contributes to the spread of meritocracy: “not only will people rise as far as their talents and hard work will take them; their success will be their own doing, and they will deserve the rewards that come their way” (68, emphasis added). In the lead up to the election of Donald Trump, however, this kind of language saw a steep decline in use as the populist backlash against elites and their use of this language began to spread. Trump, for his part, refused to use this rhetoric, employing language focused on a sharp division between winners and losers. The rhetoric of rising came to be seen as a liberal talking point: “Trump supporters resented liberals’ rhetoric of rising, not because they rejected meritocracy, but because they believed it described the prevailing social order” (73). In this sense, the entire concept was viewed with suspicion because it represented the social order that seemed to be directly contributing to their failure to succeed.

There are three main reasons that the language and reality of meritocracy have become toxic. First, widespread inequality makes this message seem fatalistic, especially for those at a disadvantage in the current social and political climate. Second, the insistence that a college degree is the dividing factor between success and failure demeans and diminishes The Dignity of Work which falls outside the need for specific academic credentials. Third, the ordinary citizen is disempowered by the technocratic order that insists on only the most highly educated and qualified being given power.

The fact of the matter is that “American faith in the ability to rise through effort and grit no longer fits the facts on the ground” (75). The reality is that economic mobility in America has never been more difficult, and many other countries allow for this kind of mobility in much wider areas with far greater ease. Unfortunately, most current politicians still act like this is not the case, and have insisted on confusing the facts with a dream or a hope: “If meritocracy is an aspiration, those who fall short can always blame the system; but if meritocracy is a fact, those who fall short are invited to blame themselves” (80). The pride and hubris this invites are one of the many reasons that the current climate has become so acrid and polarizing.

Chapter 4 Summary: Credentialism: The Last Acceptable Prejudice

The need for political figures to come across as intelligent and qualified is an unquestioned assumption. However, this absolute need for a qualified academic background has become so widespread that questions about the tangential assumptions that come along with it have begun to surface. The immediate issue is the “weaponization of college credentials” (85) that has led to the tyrannical rule of academic merit, raising questions about The Place and Importance of Education.

The common insistence on a college education began as a hopeful and aspirational ideal intent on providing access to as many opportunities as possible for the individual, whose education would presumably open far more doors than would be offered without such an education. Education became the centerpiece of political rhetoric throughout the 1990s and 2000s for both sides of the political divide. In the words of Thomas Frank, “every big economic problem is really an education problem” (88). Creating greater access to higher education is, in principle, a noble ideal. In reality, however, the majority who do not possess a college degree are made to feel the damaging effects of a social stigma on account of the meritocratic demand for higher education: “[T]he reigning evaluative contrast has become smart versus dumb” (92).

Nowhere is this educational divide seen more than in the composition of the various government bodies, where college-educated elites make up a near 100% monopoly in government positions. While governance by the educated would seem to be a desired prerequisite, the problem surfaces when education fails to inculcate what is necessary to actually govern well: “Governing well requires practical wisdom and civic virtue—an ability to deliberate about the common good and to pursue it effectively. But neither of these capacities is developed very well in most universities today” (99). There is a stark contrast between the knowledge gained in an educational institution and the wisdom and virtue required to actually be a good leader.

One of the greatest shifts in political demographics has been in the affiliation of those with and without college degrees. In the 1950s, for instance, those without college degrees tended to be aligned with the political left. In the last 25 years, however, that demographic has completely shifted, as those without access to higher education increasingly self-identify as politically right-leaning. The manner in which political leaders approach this reality—and how their language can either endear a group to them, or alienate a particular group—says much about the current technocratic meritocracy that has arisen largely thanks to the globalization of the world’s economy, and the seeming necessity of a college education in order to participate in that economy. The problem is that this is not the experience, or even the desire, of the average, working-class citizen.

Chapters 3-4 Analysis

Chapter 3 starts out with a biting judgment: the logic of merit corrodes the public’s ability and desire to work for the common good. The prevailing wisdom is that merit allows for the best to rise to the top, in a trickledown philosophy that the greatest people will achieve the greatest success, and that they will also be able to achieve the greatest financial success. In turn, money will flow to people who are not only talented, but who are good. Unfortunately, this logic is damaging to the common good on account of the fact that meritocracy sets people up for failure in moral rectitude on both ends of the spectrum.

The meritocratic perspective practically ensures that those who succeed see themselves as better and more deserving of the rewards they win, and that they simultaneously view those who fail to achieve their heights as failures less worthy of respect. On the flip side, those who fail to achieve this narrow, technocratically-defined manner of success are left feeling as if they are personally flawed as individuals and unworthy or undeserving of a good life. When the rhetoric of rising rose to prominence, the Western world was enjoying a previously unknown stretch of affluence in the wake of the Second World War. The United States was a global superpower, and it seemed impossible that anyone with even a modicum of talent, combined with a good work ethic, would fail to get ahead in life. While previously politicians had spoken of responsibility and respect for one’s neighbor, the second half of the 20th century saw a shift in the language of responsibility towards a primarily self-centered notion of the concept: One still needed to be responsible, but one needed to responsible for one’s own self, and a failure to be responsible would result in individual failure to succeed.

After a number of decades, however, this language and worldview was reinterpreted as mostly empty promises, resulting in the populist backlash of the mid-aughts. Rampant inequality was on prominent display in all social and racial demographics, and the population saw the rhetoric of rising not as speaking to a possible reality that could be achieved in their own lives, but as merely descriptive of the current social order—a social order that had left most of them on the outside looking in. For many people, as Chapter 4 introduces, this feeling of being left on the outside was the result of not possessing the social cache awarded by having a four-year degree.

As Sandel notes, all manner of judgment and criticism is no longer socially acceptable, but one of the few remaining prejudices permitted—even encouraged—in public life is the judgment that anyone who fails to garner academic credentials is less worthy of holding positions of influence, power, or prestige. Having access to higher education has been so weaponized in contemporary politics, for example, that to not have gone to college is essentially a poison pill for a career in civil service. Education, in the abstract, is an undeniably good and desirable thing; the problem is that higher education was sold as a panacea for all the world’s problems, and as a skeleton key for access to any manner of high-paying jobs after graduation.

The opposite has proved to be the case, but this is hardly the most important issue. The issue, says the author, is that the meritocratic insistence on higher education has divided the country into the “educated” and the “ignorant.” In seeing college as the only answer, social esteem and dignity are afforded to the college-educated in a way that is largely denied to those who cannot, or choose not to, attend college or university. In an age where many biases are being called into question and being actively fought against, credentialism—explicit and voluntary bias against those without specific and arbitrarily-defined academic experience—is a bias that is not only tolerated, but actively encouraged and practiced. While it is theoretically desirable to have the most well-educated in office, it is highly doubtful that today’s university system actually inculcates the necessary practical virtue necessary to rule and govern well. There is a radical distinction between knowledge and wisdom; colleges are geared to impart knowledge and induct students into the world of the technocratic meritocracy, but what is needed—and sorely absent in contemporary public life—is a return to virtue, honor, and wisdom.

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