The Power Elite

Operating in a nation in which both the elite and the general population accept the military’s definition of reality, warlords are more powerful in the mid-20th-century US than ever before. No other elite group has their training in economic, political, and military affairs. The ascendancy of the top military leaders came about largely because politicians defaulted on their job of debating policies and, instead, hid behind military expertise. Likewise, political administrators failed to create a civilian career service. The military was drawn into politics as well in response to civilian criticism. Faced with criticism, top military leaders chose not to withdraw, but to form alliances with political figures and fight back. In effect, political decisions are increasingly treated as military necessities, a pattern that surrenders civilian control of political decisions to the military.

As the US became a world power, the military establishment expanded, and its top leaders blended into diplomatic and political circles. In the 1950s, members of both major political parties are generals, with high-ranking officers contributing to political debates. The elite and the public increasingly accept the military’s authority in areas that historically were beyond its purview. Mills notes that they exert the most influence in foreign policy and international relations at a time when those decisions are at “the center of the most important national decisions” (206). The State Department and foreign diplomats lost an effective voice in this area for three reasons. First, he cites a relatively weak professional diplomatic service that leaves career diplomats unable to advance to top positions. Instead, those positions are often given to unqualified political appointees. Second, investigations undermined the service, resulting in the dismissal of diplomats for lack of loyalty, as well as low morale among those who remain in this sector. Third, military leaders bypassed diplomats as the former became ambassadors and special envoys. These military leaders, not the diplomats, were the ones who negotiated peace treaties in the aftermath of World War II, for example.

Following World War II, the corporate economy and the military bureaucracy merged. The US shifted toward a permanent war economy, with the greatest amount of governmental spending going to the military. Indeed, this military enlargement shapes the American economic structure, with corporate and military interests coinciding. Similarly, "the military is the largest single supporter [...] of scientific research" (216). The US government spends 85% of its budget for research on national security. Mills claims that some universities became financial branches of the military.

The "warlords" preside over a massive and sophisticated public relations campaign that seeks to enhance the prestige of the military establishment and build respect for its personnel. Given the lack of visibility of any contrasting views, this campaign entrenches the military’s vision of reality in the public's mind. The military’s pursuit of higher status and prestige becomes a threat when it is invoked outside the military hierarchy and as a basis for policy. As Mills again points out, the Constitution places the military in a subordinate role to political leaders. However, military leaders are moving into elite political circles and influencing decisions. Mills argues that the key to status is power. The military is, thus, increasing its power relative to political and economic elites, even expanding into sectors such as education and science to achieve its goals. Yet Mills concludes that the interests of the political, economic, and military elite coincide. The military leaders in the mid-20th century are an integral part of the power elite.

During the 20th century, the political establishment in the US enlarged and acquired more power, and this increased power attracted new types of people to government work. Mills identifies two types of politicians: party politicians and political professionals. The former spend their careers inside a political organization and are partisans, while the latter spend their careers in the administrative area of government and become political if they advance into the policy-making level. At midcentury, those at the political top are unlikely to be from either of these groups; that position is usually held by political outsiders, those who spent most of their careers outside political organizations.

Mills observes that the “center of initiative and decision has shifted from the Congress to the executive” (229) in American governance through an enlarged and centralized executive branch. As a result, individuals covet positions in executive command posts. This shift enables the political elite to bypass local and state offices and begin political careers at the national level. In 1789, 93% of the political elite had once held local or state office, as opposed to 57% in the Eisenhower administration. The shift, additionally, made it less likely that the political elite previously served in the national legislature and more likely that positions are appointed, not elected. He notes that in his era, the first group in charge of executive decisions includes about 50 people, 75% of whom are political outsiders. A second team of young, urban, and Ivy-educated people “handle most of the administrative functions of governing” (233). Both groups represent the corporate rich and serve as loyal agents to the executive. They advance to these positions because their superiors, whom they resemble, consider them trustworthy.

Such advancement based on subjective criteria is made possible by the absence of a genuine bureaucracy in the US. In a bureaucracy, there is an organized hierarchy; advancement is based on knowledge and skill as initially demonstrated through a test and later proven by experience (236). Civil servants are politically neutral and remain in place despite changes in partisanship. Instead of such a system, the US awards the top layer of positions as a matter of patronage. Those in these positions are, therefore, not experts; rather, they are people trained to conform. Mills notes that the political directorate—the power elite—does not want expert administrators. Instead, members of the power elite themselves occupy “the executive centers of decision” (241).