58 pages • 1 hour read
Thomas L. FriedmanA modern alternative to SparkNotes and CliffsNotes, SuperSummary offers high-quality Study Guides with detailed chapter summaries and analysis of major themes, characters, and more.
This chapter argues that that the USSR, the Southeast Asian countries, Brazil, China, GM, and IBM all either collapsed or had to restructure at the same time because of the same systemic change that tore down the Berlin Wall: Microchip Immune Deficiency Syndrome (MIDS), which is the “disease” of the globalization system. MIDS occurs when countries and companies fail to adapt to the changes brought about by the microchip and by the three democratizations. The only cure to MIDS is open information and a more even distribution of power.
The onset of MIDS has been a three-stage evolution. In the first stage, from World War One until the late-1970s, everything was protected because the three democratizations had not yet happened. The second stage took place during the 1980s, when the three democratizations destroyed this slow-moving world in what came to be known later as the “Information Revolution,” which was as fundamental a break as was the discovery as electricity. The Information Revolution lowered barriers to entry, which increased competition, as well as letting consumers more easily communicate their preferences to companies, or shift to ones that would give them what they wanted. This culminated with the internet, which is essentially a competitive world market. These changes have been wonderful for consumers but terrible for businesses, who now must work much harder to give consumers what they want.
The third stage is the present era of globalization, where countries and companies either restructure themselves to take advantage of the three democratizations, or fail to do so and succumb to MIDS. This stage is where the fourth democratization is taking place: the democratization of decision-making and the de-concentration of power and information. If countries and companies do not undertake this democratization, they will be at a huge disadvantage as other institutions make use of combined world knowledge. Freidman summarizes: “none of us is as smart as all of us.” (88)
The motto of new leaders should no longer be, “the buck stops here” because, to be effective, leaders need to focus on setting broad strategies and trust their employees to make decisions quickly and efficiently. The biggest challenge is adapting to the internet and e-business, creating a thriving market for educators who teach countries and companies to use the internet efficiently. For countries and companies to survive and thrive, they must integrate the internet into their businesses.
The first era of globalization gave rise to ideologies that emphasized centrally planned, non-democratic alternatives to capitalism, such as Communism, Socialism, and Fascism. These alternatives were tested in various countries between 1917-1989 and all failed, and thus the historical debate has been definitively settled in favor of free-market capitalism. While other systems might be better at distributing or dividing income, only free-market capitalism is good at generating that income in the first place. In other words, there is no alternative to free-market capitalism, though societies can adjust by doing it slightly faster or slower.
Once countries finally realize this, they put on the “Golden Straitjacket,” which is “the defining political-economic garment of the globalization era.” (104) The original “seamstress” of this garment was Margaret Thatcher, followed by Ronald Reagan, and it became global fashion after the end of the Cold War. To fit in the golden straitjacket, countries must: drive economic growth through the private sector, shrink state bureaucracy, budget, eliminate tariffs and restrictions on foreign investment, privatize state-owned industries and utilities, and de-regulate the economy. Once a country puts on the golden straitjacket, its economy grows as its political field shrinks; there is more economic growth, but the policy choices of political parties are restricted and thus the parties become more similar to each other. The only way to create more space to maneuver politically is by enlarging the straitjacket, and the only way to do that is by keeping it on as tightly as possible. Countries can attempt to resist putting on the straitjacket, but they delude themselves if they think they won’t pay an increasingly high cost for that decision.
The three democratizations didn’t just blow away the walls protecting alternative systems but created a new power source: the Electronic Herd. The herd is made up of traders: “all the faceless stock, bond, and currency traders sitting behind computer screens all over the globe, moving their money around from mutual funds to pension funds to emerging market funds, or trading on the Internet from their basements.” (110) The herd also consists of multinational companies who move their production around the world to the most efficient and lowest-cost locations. Because countries are reliant on the electronic herd, they must put on the golden straitjacket to receive investment capital. In contrast, those that don’t put on the golden straitjacket (or try to take it off) are disciplined by the herd by having money and capital taken out of the country, stifling growth. This interaction between the electronic herd, the golden straitjacket, and nation-states is the center of the globalization system.
The defining truth of the globalization system is that there is no leadership. There is only the electronic herd, which follows the rules of the golden straitjacket. If you live by those rules, you reap the benefits. The herd is fallible and can make mistakes but will always correct them because “the herd is never stupid for too long” (113) and always responds to good economic governance. The herd is made up of two groups: 1) “Short-Horn Cattle” who move money around on a short-term basis such as traders, hedge funds, and individual investors; and 2) “Long-Horn Cattle,” multinational companies who make foreign direct investment to build factories or make production deals with overseas companies. While the public sector and government dominated capital investment until the end of the 1970s, the subsequent lifting of capital controls has meant that the electronic herd has taken over, and private capital has replaced government spending.
Short-horn cattle have become increasingly important as there are more and more financial products to invest in. Almost everything is now securitized and traded on financial markets, which has unlocked trillions of dollars in assets and given the electronic herd more to feed on than ever before. This has been a godsend to countries because they can grow faster than ever, but at the same time it becomes harder for investors to find an edge in an environment of increased competition. Because of this, there has been an increase in hedge funds and others making high-risk, high-reward bets. Similarly, because the herd is bigger, more diverse, and much faster than ever before, crises can easily be magnified and spread globally. When markets in a country become unstable or weak, “the electronic herd can transform what might have been a brutal but limited market adjustment downward into something much more painful and exaggerated.” (132)
In contrast, long-horn cattle are involved in foreign direct investment, meaning that they invest directly in projects like factories that take time to plan and build. This type of investment is not new, but thanks to globalization, these long-horn cattle invest more, and in more ways than ever before. In the Cold War system, companies would use these investments to jump over walls, such as a Japanese car manufacturer building a factory in the US to avoid tariffs, but there is now a single global market and companies slice up their production chain to locate each segment in the place that can do that task the cheapest and most efficiently.
While long-horn cattle don’t move capital in and out of countries as fast as the short-horn cattle, they do it faster than many realize. Now, instead of building their own factories, many multinationals develop alliances with local subcontractors that can easily take advantage of lower taxes or lower-cost labor elsewhere. This allows companies to play developing countries off against each other because they all need investment to grow.
Unlike the Cold War system, where smaller countries could negotiate with the two superpowers, every government is susceptible to the needs of the herd. There is no fighting with the electronic herd, and all leaders (especially those in developing countries) can do is try to be as inviting as possible. Finally, because of the internet, these forces are only going to get stronger and make the fast world, the electronic herd, and the golden straitjacket even more important.
Globalization has made countries analogous to computers. The “hardware” of a country is the shell around the economy, such as free-market, communist, or hybrid. The “operating system” of a country is its macroeconomic policies, such as central planning in communist states (DOScapital 0.0). In hybrid states, the operating system ranges from DOScapital 1.0-4.0 depending on the mix of socialism, free-markets, state-directed economics, and crony capitalism. Finally, in free-market states there are those with significant welfare states (DOScapital 5.0) and those that have fully liberalized (DOScapital 6.0). The “software” of a state is its legal and regulatory system, as well as how well it follows the rule of law.
In the Cold War system, the struggle was over which hardware would dominate the world: free-market US hardware or communist Soviet hardware. These two superpowers did not care about how well this hardware worked in other countries, only that they were on their team. With the collapse of the USSR, every country now uses free-market hardware. However, in both computers and countries, “the hardware always runs ahead of the software and the operating systems.” (153) Because of this, there are lots of countries running free-market hardware without the software and operating system to effectively use it. This is the problem of “premature globalization” where you cannot thrive without plugging into the electronic herd, but you cannot survive the herd without the right software and operating system. Instead of communists versus capitalists, this means that the defining struggle is between free-market democrats and free-market kleptocrats.
During the Cold War, it was the size of the state that mattered, but now it is the quality of the state that matters; you need a smaller, smarter, faster state that can regulate the free market without either smothering it or letting it get out of control. Those states that had high-quality software and operating systems were those that survived the economic crises of the 1990s, whereas those that copied western financial systems without the operating systems and software to match, struggled. Developing should instead copy the real source of American prosperity: “the combination of the right operating system-free markets-with the right software, political institutions, and political consensus.” (164)
This section of the book discusses in more specificity how globalization operates. Friedman identifies the key drivers of globalization as being the members of the Electronic Herd, and the defining set of policies of globalization as the Golden Straitjacket. Friedman also introduces in this section his analogy between computers and countries, which he uses throughout the rest of the book, particularly in the next section, when he describes how countries can choose prosperity.
The concept of the electronic herd is the most important concept to Friedman’s overall arguments that globalization is an unstoppable, but positive, force that everyone must adapt to. If globalization is a way of concisely describing the new system within which we find ourselves, then the electronic herd are the actors who made globalization what it is and make globalization work.
Friedman uses the concept of the herd to distinguish between the superpower-dominated Cold War system and the market-driven globalization system. While the leaders of the US and the USSR drove the Cold War, globalization is instead driven by millions of individual investors from everyday workers investing their pension funds to super-empowered hedge fund manages like George Soros. In addition, while the herd tends to all move together (hence why Friedman uses the herd analogy for investors) it has no leaders because it is made up of many individuals who are simply following market incentives and looking to make a profit rather than pursue ideological or political battles. To Friedman, the electronic herd is the driving force of globalization as both a system and a process because it is the human embodiment of dispassionate market forces.
To Friedman, there is no alternative to globalization, which he emphasizes with the concept of the golden straitjacket. The concept of “There is No Alternative” is not of Friedman’s invention, but was rather a campaign slogan used by UK Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher. Much like Friedman argues in this book, Thatcher also argued that global capitalism, deregulation, and privatization was not just the best and only way to build wealth and prosperity. Similarly, both argue that free market liberal principles of free choice are defining moral principles and that the market forces of global capitalism are unstoppable and immutable. One can either adapt themselves to these forces in the ways demanded or attempt to build ever-higher walls, which will eventually fail.
In this section, Friedman introduces the concept of the golden straitjacket. Though the term was not in use at the time, this set of policy proposals is similar to the austerity measures which many countries adopted in the wake of the global financial crises of 2007-2008. Friedman considers this a “straitjacket” because once a country chooses to put it on, it becomes almost impossible to take it off again. Attempting to remove it provokes capital flight by the electronic herd, devastating the economy. At the same time, it is “golden” because Friedman argues that this set of policies allows countries to choose prosperity by allowing them to take advantage of globalization and grow their economies. The income generated by this growth can then be subject to some mild redistribution to temporarily assist those who have been most disrupted by systemic changes.
By Thomas L. Friedman