57 pages • 1 hour read
Barbara W. TuchmanThe Guns of August
Nonfiction | Book | Adult | Published in 1962A modern alternative to SparkNotes and CliffsNotes, SuperSummary offers high-quality Study Guides with detailed chapter summaries and analysis of major themes, characters, and more.
Chapters 10-12Chapter Summaries & Analyses
Chapter 10 Summary: “Goebe […] n Enemy Then Flying”
As the war begins, Germany makes overtures to Turkey. Russia is Turkey’s enemy, and England has written it off as “the sick man of Europe” (161). Germany enters an alliance with Turkey to cut off Russia’s access to the Mediterranean, and thus cut off its supplies, but as events progress, Turkey does nothing to help Germany. Meanwhile, the French and British fleets attempt to establish dominance in the Mediterranean so the French can transport 80,000 troops from North Africa to France. Rear Admiral Wilhelm Anton Souchon, in charge of the two ships that comprise the German fleet, and Sir George Milne, in charge of the British fleet, hunt for each other as the war looms closer.
They also move themselves into attack positions, though the war has not yet been declared and orders from governments are slow in coming. On August 4, running up a Russian flag, Souchon opens fire on Phillipeville in Algeria. The Breslau, a second German ship, opens fire on the Algerian city of Bone. Afterward, Souchon, following orders from Germany, heads to Constantinople. The British ships follow but cannot catch up, though they are unable to fire anyway, as war has not been declared. The next morning, though now free to fire, they cannot find the Germans. For several days, the British fleet gives chase to the two German ships but fails to catch them. Because of their disdain for Turkey, they never think the Germans are heading for an alliance. Thus, another opportunity is lost.
When the German ships approach the Straits of Dardanelle, Turkey agrees, after a few tense moments, to let them enter. As Turkey is still trying to hold on to neutrality, it claims to be buying the German ships. Pressured by the Turkish government, France and Russia both promise to pay Turkey to remain neutral. For nearly three months, Turkey does so. However, on October 28, Souchon, commanding the Goeben and Breslau, enters the Black Sea and shells Odessa, Sevastopol, and Feodosia. The act cuts off Russia from the Mediterranean, ending 95% of its imports and 98% of its exports. Russia declares war on Turkey on November 4. Britain and France follow on November 5. This draws Turkey’s neighbors—Bulgaria, Rumania, Italy, and Greece—into the conflict.
Chapter 11 Summary: “Liège and Alsace”
As the ground war begins, Germany and France move around each other like a revolving door, Germany’s far right wing traveling through Belgium and France’s far right wing through Alsace. The Germans want to capture Liège, and the French want to take back Alsace to stir up patriotic sentiment. Though Liège is heavily fortified, the Belgian army is outnumbered. As Germany attempts to cross the Meuse River and finds that the bridges have been blown up, it also takes on fire. The Germans believe that the Belgians will not fight them, and they want to terrorize other towns, so they shoot civilians. When they attack the forts surrounding Liège, they are cut down by machine gun fire but continue to throw themselves forward and die. The Germans finally break through, angered by the Belgian resistance, and the Belgium Field Army falls back. While the world praises Belgium for its initial defeat of the German army, King Albert seeks assistance from France and England, but French war plans do not include helping Belgium beyond offering it a token four divisions. With the Belgians gone, Germany takes the city of Liège, but the forts surrounding it still stand. Transportation problems slow attempts to bring up Germany’s heavy guns.
In France, the French army prepares for the German attack. It also prepares to take back the Alsace region, though some French generals believe it might be a trap, as it is very lightly guarded by German troops. As the French take the village of Mulhouse, German troops surround them. After a day-long battle, the French are forced to retreat. Meanwhile, French cavalry enters Belgium to ascertain German plans. When German cavalry is once again shot down by rifles, this small Belgian victory over German forces bolsters both the Belgian and French morale. However, Germany then brings up its big guns and bombards the forts around Liège, which fall one after another. Belgium only throws off Germany’s timetable by two days, but it does give the world “a cause and an example” (193).
Chapter 12 Summary: “BEF to the Continent”
When the English enter the war, they exhibit many of the same problems as the other nations—namely, squabbling among themselves. The English reluctance to commit is obvious as military and civilian leaders argue over how many troops to send, where to send them, and whether to send any at all. As secretary of war, Field Marshal Lord Kitchener wants to delay sending the British Expeditionary Force (BEF) to the mainland, but not out of recalcitrance. He doesn’t see the force as large enough to change the outcome, and he sees the war lasting much longer than anyone else believes; he thinks England will need a much larger and much better-trained force. Conventional wisdom prevails, however, and the planning that was already in process moves forward.
The leaders continue to squabble—now Kitchener agrees with moving the BEF, but he wants to change where it sets up. Kitchener anticipates the German envelopment, but no one believes him—or rather, they are already committed to old plans and won’t accept any reason to change. The BEF begins debarkation at Southampton and Portsmouth, sending 80,000 men and 30,000 horses across the channel. Within a few days, Sir John French, commander of the BEF, learns about the large number of German reserves being used, but it is too late to make any change in plans. Kitchener is forced to give up his strategy of forming defensive positions farther back but, to protect his troops, gives contradicting orders: The BEF is part of the French army, but under no circumstances should it engage the enemy in large numbers. As the Germans are clearing Liège and the forts there, the BEF is marching into Belgium, where, in the small villages, women ask for souvenirs and troops cheer from the rooftops. As one cavalry officer will say later, the advance is “roses all the way” (205).
Chapters 10-12 Analysis
As the war begins, Tuchman again points out opportunities the Allied forces (England, France, Russia, Belgium) missed, developing the theme of The Ripple Effects of Individual Actions. She mentions the fact that French Admiral de Lapeyrère, who oversaw France’s navy in the Mediterranean, never thought the Goeben would be performing a diplomatic mission. Had Grey sent his ultimatum without hesitation, Allied forces might have stopped Souchon’s mission aboard the Goeben, which sealed the alliance between Germany and Turkey. Moreover, in a radio transmission to the admiralty, Milne fails to report which way the Goeben is headed; the admiralty believes it is going west, toward the French transports, rather than east, toward Constantinople and its important diplomatic mission. For days the British chase the German fleet, missing each time. An error by a wireless clerk halts Milne in his pursuit of the Germans. The resulting Germany-Turkey alliance will reverberate throughout history: It cuts off Russia’s access to supplies and brings more of the world into the war, as all of Turkey’s neighbors join, extending the war far beyond the six months both sides believe it will last. Afterward, Churchill will say the two German ships brought “more slaughter, more misery and more ruin than has ever before been borne within the compass of a ship” (159).
These details once again raise the question of “what if.” Tuchman continually points out the opportunities lost, and each chapter becomes about what might have happened as well as what actually did. In this way, she frames war not only as a series of plans but also as the product of mistakes, blunders, and lost opportunities. This develops the theme of The Courage of Ordinary Soldiers Versus the Military Machine; common soldiers pay the price for the missteps of those in power.
Tuchman’s account of Belgian resistance presents the first major example of this juxtaposition of the valor of ordinary troops against the ineffectuality of leadership. France, for example, does not care about Belgium as long as its own war plans are kept intact, yet the Belgian forces demonstrate great courage and determination. In noting the German belief that Belgium will not fight at all, Tuchman emphasizes the steep odds Belgium faces. German troops are enraged that the Belgian army holds out so long, as they have been informed, again and again, that the Belgians would offer no resistance. However, the resistance is there, and it throws off Germany’s timetable, which is an important side effect of the Belgian resistance, as it gives the world “a cause and an example” (193).
France also has timetable problems, but ones that are different from Germany: French officers refuse to believe any information that might throw their timetable off or that is in opposition to their plans. They cannot help Belgium because that will change Plan 17, their master war plan. General Joffre is enraged when the French army must fall back from Alsace, and he fires anyone who fails to execute their plans. In this, Tuchman’s account echoes historical arguments that WWI was so disastrous primarily because of inept and inflexible planning and leadership. The evolution of the technology and weaponry of war exacerbates the problem: Soldiers repeatedly attempt to use bayonets and sabers against armies supplied with machine guns, literally bringing knives to a gunfight. Even the trench warfare for which WWI would become famous was the result of poor planning. Military leaders expected clear lines and flanks but found themselves resorting to trenches to cope with advances in machinery.
Tuchman’s account of the internal dissent within England contributes further to the atmosphere of chaos and incompetence. The civilian government and the army leaders do not agree on how to fight the war. Civilians are mostly of the opinion that most of the army should stay home to protect England (or not engage at all). The army leaders also do not agree with one another. Lord Kitchener, somewhere in between the two as a military man sitting in a civilian cabinet position, wants the army to assemble at Amiens instead of Maubeuge. He reasons that he sees the German enveloping tactic coming for them, and he feels that pushing the British Expeditionary Force so far forward will be fatal. However, the plans for the war have been in effect for five years, and Kitchener is outnumbered and overruled when “[t]he momentum of predetermined plans […] score[s] another victory” (204). To protect the British army, Kitchener gives contradictory orders, telling his subordinates that they are part of the French army but that they should not move forward if France does. They should not allow themselves to be “duly exposed to attack” (205). Further, Kitchener states that Sir John French, commander of the BEF, is “entirely independent” and will “in no case come in any sense under the orders of an Allied general” (205). Consequently, there is no clear, organized effort on the part of the Allied powers, making them weak and vulnerable to the organized German attack. This account of Britain’s position in the war’s early days again underscores that much of the atrocity of WWI was a result of inertia and a lack of nimble leadership.
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