61 pages • 2 hours read
Russ Shafer LandauThe Fundamentals of Ethics
Nonfiction | Reference/Text Book | Adult | Published in 2009A modern alternative to SparkNotes and CliffsNotes, SuperSummary offers high-quality Study Guides with detailed chapter summaries and analysis of major themes, characters, and more.
Part 3, Chapters 19-21Chapter Summaries & Analyses
Part 3: “Metaethics: The Status of Morality”
Chapter 19 Summary and Analysis: “Ethical Relativism”
Chapter 19 marks the beginning of Part 3 on metaethics. It explores two theories that question the status of ethics. The lack of belief in the existence of objective moral standards is called moral skepticism. The theory can take two forms: moral nihilism, which argues there is no moral truth at all, and ethical relativism, which asserts that moral truths are not objective but rather relative to individuals or societies.
Chapter 19 explores the theory of ethical relativism. It can take two forms: cultural relativism and individual relativism (also called ethical subjectivism). The first claims cultures and societies determine which moral standards are true. The second claims that moral standards are relative to every individual. There are several advantages to cultural relativism and ethical subjectivism. First, they cater to the human experience, either on a societal or an individual scale. Second, they are straightforward: Morality is what any individual or society deems acceptable. Third, they can easily identify individuals and societies as the ultimate source of moral knowledge. Finally, they are egalitarian because almost everyone is considered a good judge of morality and everyone’s opinions are equally valid.
Relativism and subjectivism are both flawed since societies and individuals can be mistaken about morality. Their principles can be based on ignorance and falsehoods. For example, relativism categorically rejects the ideas of people who disagree with conventional wisdom, such as iconoclasts. It would also deem long-established sexist ideals as morally appropriate. Meanwhile, subjectivism renders each individual an infallible judge who can only be mistaken if they change their mind. While this may seem fair on the surface, the actual result is that intolerant outlooks (such as Nazism) are considered equally valid as the rest.
Relativism and subjectivism also leave no room for moral progress. While societies and individuals may change their minds about ethics, their previous views were as valid as their current ones. In other words, moral change is possible, but moral progress is not.
Finally, both theories generate contradictions. Subjectivism, for example, would allow an anti-abortionist to be equally right as a pro-choicer. However, abortion cannot be both right and wrong. This is called the “Contradiction Problem for Subjectivism” (301). Relativism faces the same criticism. Two different cultures can have opposing understandings of women’s role in society, and they may believe both are true, respective of their cultures. However, if they are simply reporting on the conditions of their culture, all talk of morality vanishes. Therefore, to engage in true moral debate, relativism and subjectivism must concede they generate contradictions.
To push back against these arguments, subjectivism revised its theory to include the concept of an ideal observer, that is to say, someone who is fully informed, rational, and dispassionate. Its new claim is that an act is morally correct only if the ideal observer would approve of it. This fix addresses the objections listed above. It implies that individuals and societies may be mistaken in their judgments if they are not as well informed or dispassionate or rational as the ideal observer. It also means all views are no longer equivalent and moral progress is possible. The contradiction problem also disappears.
However, new problems are created. First, ideal observers may disagree with each other. This is a minor problem since it can be fixed by claiming that moral acts are required when all ideal observers are in agreement and permitted when there is some conflict. The second problem is more difficult to solve as it involves the same line of argument as the divine command theory. On one hand, if ideal observers are arbiters of morality, then they may decide that killing innocent people is morally right. On the other hand, if morality exists independently of the ideal observer, then subjectivism, the belief that no objective moral rule exists, falls apart entirely. As attractive as relativism and subjectivism are, their premises are subject to contradiction.
Chapter 20 Summary and Analysis: “Moral Nihilism”
Chapter 20 turns to moral nihilism, which denies the existence of moral truths. Nihilists argue that fact and value are mutually exclusive. Values cannot be factual as they cannot describe anything concrete. Since values are not informative, they cannot be true, and since ethics are about value judgment, they cannot be based in reality. There are two forms of moral nihilism: error theory and expressivism. Error theory radically rejects all moral claims as sham. Expressivism denies that they reflect reality.
Shafer-Landau begins the chapter with error theory. This form of moral nihilism expresses four fundamental doubts about morality. First, error theorists do not believe moral features exist in this world. Morality does not possess scientific qualities and cannot be seen or probed. Second, since morality is not based on facts, no moral judgments can be true. Third, without moral facts, any attempt to describe moral features is fundamentally misguided. Finally, given all of the above, there can be no moral knowledge.
There are two lines of criticism moral objectivists levy at the error theory. The first is called “Argument from Disastrous Results” and claims that error theory is wrong because without morality, disaster would ensue (313). This is a misguided attack because even if disaster were to ensue, it would not prove (or disprove) the existence of objective moral rules. In other words, the error theory is concerned not with ethics, but with metaethics, which cannot be tested by looking at the moral results of any action. For example, even if all atheists were immoral and all theists perfect angels, that would still not prove the existence of God. The second attack targets error theorists themselves and claims they cannot be trustworthy people since they do not believe in the existence of morality. This argument is an example of the ad hominem attack. The attitude of error theorists has no bearing on the truth of their philosophy.
Next, Shafer-Landau turns to expressivism, which agrees with the first two clauses of error theory. It argues that the world does not have any moral features and all moral judgments are false. However, it disagrees with clause three, which states that moral claims cannot reflect the world. According to expressivists, moral claims do not describe true facts but are an adequate way for people to vent their feelings. For example, when people claim that torture is immoral, they are not stating an objective fact but expressing their personal distaste for torture. This way, expressivists can simultaneously deny the existence of ethical objectivity while maintaining some confidence in human morality. In other words, moral claims are a matter of personal feelings and commitments.
There are several problems with expressivism. The first is that it forbids any sort of moral deliberation. Since all moral claims are about feelings rather than facts, they cannot be used as premises for logical argumentation. This seems rather outlandish considering Shafer-Landau’s book has successfully mounted many such arguments. The second problem is that of the amoralist, who sincerely makes moral claims but does not act on them. Expressivism cannot explain the existence of the amoralist, who speaks one way and yet is wholly unmotivated to act in accordance with their feelings. Finally, it is implausible to claim people are fundamentally misguided when they believe they are making moral statements. Someone who is convinced water is wet may be equally convinced that torture is wrong. To insist that the second claim is in fact only about personal feelings seems farfetched. This unique feature of expressivism is hard to defend given that every other theory, including error theory, believes that people’s moral claims attempt to speak about reality.
Chapter 21 Summary and Analysis: “Eleven Arguments Against Moral Objectivity”
The final chapter observes 11 common arguments that challenge moral objectivity. Shafer-Landau’s goal is to demonstrate how some of these skepticisms are incorrect, and even the ones that are more plausible can still be reasonably refuted. He orders them from least convincing to most.
The first on the list is the “Argument from Absolutism” (325), which claims that all objective moral claims must be absolute. The fault in the argument is clear: Objectivity is about the status of any moral claim, whereas absoluteness is about their stringency. The two are wholly different; therefore, claiming that they are the same is erroneous.
The second objection is called the “Argument Against Objective Truths” (325). It states that there are no objective truths and therefore no objective moral truths. This argument is clearly flawed because if the first premise is true, it is self-contradictory. In other words, if there are truly no objective truths, then the premise itself becomes true, which is logically self-defeating.
The third objection is the “Argument from Equal Rights” (326). It claims that all moral opinions are equally plausible if everyone has equal rights to having an opinion. If everyone is right in their own way, then moral objectivity is false. The flaw in this argument is that having equal rights to an opinion says nothing about the plausibility of that opinion being correct.
The fourth objection is the “Argument from Dogmatism” (326), which declares that objective moral standards encourage dogmatism, which is unacceptable. This argument is shallow since it does nothing to prove that objectivism really promotes dogmatism. Shafer-Landau also points out that it is perfectly normal for people to believe an answer to a question can be objectively true without knowing what it is exactly. There is no reason to believe objectivity will always lead to ideological rigidity.
Objection 5 is the “Argument from Tolerance” (329), which claims objectivity prevents moral tolerance while subjectivity promotes the coexistence of different moral views. As shown in Chapter 19, this is false because if everyone’s moral views were equally plausible, then intolerant outlooks would have as much weight as the rest of them. In other words, objectivity is required for promoting tolerance.
The sixth objection is the “Argument from Cultural Differences” (330). It states that moral standards should apply universally if ethical objectivism were true. Given how varied moral standards are across time and space, then, ethical objectivism must be false. Shafer-Landau’s counterargument is to emphasize that only basic moral principles apply universally. In practice, these core principles can generate different advice to fit specific cultural needs. For example, respecting others can be a universal objective principle, but the way people demonstrate respect can vary across cultures.
The seventh challenge to moral objectivity is the “Argument from Disagreement (331). It claims that even rational, open-minded, and well-informed people disagree about moral claims, and therefore surely none of those claims can be objectively true. This line of objection does not stand because disagreements abound in every field of study yet that does not mean there are no objective truths in the world. Furthermore, people might disagree about the premise itself, which renders it self-contradictory.
The eighth challenge is the “Argument from Atheism” (333). It claims that morality can only be objective if God exists because all objective laws must have an author. These rules cannot be authored by humans because humans are fallible. However, since God does not exist, objectivity must be false. This line of reasoning is illogical. After all, if atheism is true and God does not exist, then objective laws in other fields, such as physics and mathematics, must have been authored by humans, yet they remain objective. Thus, there is no reason to make an exception of objective moral laws: They do not require God to be their author to be objective.
The ninth objection is called the “Argument from Categorical Reasons” (335). It claims that objective moral rules require categorical reasons to obey them. However, there is no reason to always follow moral rules, and therefore objectivity is mistaken. There are two ways to refute this argument. The first is to detach objectivity from obligatory action. The amoralist, for example, can believe in the existence of objectivity and yet not follow moral rules. The second strategy is to argue that there exist categorical reasons for observing certain moral rules. For example, if a stranger is about to fall off a cliff, and a passerby is capable of helping him at no personal cost, there may be an imperative for him to act. Although moral philosophers are still debating this issue, Shafer-Landau believes there is no reason to categorically reject moral objectivism based on this premise alone.
Argument 10 is David Hume’s “Motivational Argument” (337). It states that moral judgments are able to motivate people while beliefs cannot. Therefore, moral judgments are not beliefs and cannot be true. In other words, moral judgments are a matter of personal opinion rather than conviction, which means they have no factual value. This argument attacks objectivity indirectly; after all, if moral judgments are all a matter of emotions with no right or wrong, by extension they cannot be objective either. There are two counterarguments to Hume’s challenge. One rejects the premise that moral judgments are always a source of motivation. This is the case of the amoralist. The other camp challenges the premise that beliefs cannot motivate. While it is true that some beliefs (such as 1+1=2) do not motivate, evaluative beliefs, which weigh the good and bad, might. For example, Kant’s concept of good will is only informed by reason and can motivate people to act independently of their emotions. This is not a definitive counterargument because the validity of Kantian philosophy and Hume’s motivational argument are still points of contention among philosophers.
The last and most important challenge to moral objectivism is inspired by a rule called Occam’s razor, named after theologian William of Occam. This rule states that entities should not be multiplied needlessly. For example, doors creaking in old houses are not a sign that ghosts exist since the phenomenon can be explained without assuming their existence (i.e. old houses are not well insulated, and wind drafts are making the doors creak). In other words, a more basic answer exists that supplants all the others. To skeptics, moral objectivity is likened to the ghost. This view is defended in the “Argument from the Scientific Test of Reality” (339). It declares that science is the best tool for evaluating the existence of matter, and since science cannot validate moral objectivism, objective moral values do not exist. There are two ways to counter this argument. The first accepts science as the ultimate tool for knowledge but rejects the premise that moral knowledge cannot be glimpsed by science. This is the viewpoint of moral naturalists, who argue that if morality exists, it has to be measurable. For example, some moral naturalists claim that moral righteousness is about maximizing happiness. Since happiness can be gauged through science, so can moral rights and wrongs. The second counterargument rejects science as the fundamental test of reality. It does so by distinguishing the goal of science, which is to describe the world, and morality, which is to express how things ought to be. Morality therefore possesses normative features: It prescribes standards of behavior and emphasizes ideals and requirements. In sum, morality operates outside the scope of science, and science cannot be the answer to every human inquiry.
