The Fundamentals of Ethics

One of the biggest problems of utilitarianism is how to measure human welfare and misery and how to measure them against each other. This chapter analyses this question in depth. Utilitarianism does not assign a specific value to welfare or misery; that is to say, welfare could be about desire satisfaction or increasing happiness. It could also be a pluralistic amalgamation of different intrinsic values. Whatever the case, it is difficult to assess the weight of each of these sources of personal welfare. To further complicate matters, Mill and other utilitarians who also ascribe to hedonism underline the importance of maximizing both the quantity and the quality of happiness. The “Argument from Value Measurement” resumes these problems. It states that utilitarianism is only valid if there are concrete ways to measure the value of one’s actions. Since there are no such units of measurement, utilitarianism must be false.

Shafer-Landau believes that morality should not ask the impossible of people. Another drawback of utilitarianism is that it may be too demanding. This is the case in three areas: deliberation, motivation, and action. The first, deliberation, asks people to gather a large amount of information and assess the different possible outcomes of their actions according to it. Mill objects to this expectation as most situations are not too complicated to assess and taking too much time deliberating defeats the purpose.

The second difficulty of putting utilitarianism to practice involves motivation: Utilitarianism, at least in principle, requires people to always act in an optimific way, which is exhausting. However, utilitarians rebuke this idea in practice, stating that striving for optimal outcomes might instead yield the opposite outcome as we spend our time calculating rather than acting. Shafer-Landau describes utilitarianism not as a guide for decision procedure (to help decide what action to take) but as a standard of rightness (to assess what is morally right).

The final objection to utilitarianism is its rigorous demand for action. If an individual has $1,000 to spare and can spend it either feeding starving children or going on vacation, they are bound by duty to choose the optimific option and forgo personal comfort for the benefit of the moral community. In other words, there is no action that is considered to be “above and beyond the call of duty” (147). Shafer-Landau does not paint this point as necessarily negative, however, given that most moral doctrines require certain amounts of sacrifice.

Utilitarianism also requires impartiality when judging which actions to take. This point could be a great advantage since everyone’s welfare is equally important, but it could also be disadvantageous if a society is deeply prejudiced against a minority group. If enslaving the minority brings greater pleasure to the majority than it generates misery for the minority, utilitarianism requires the implementation of slavery. When considered in this light, it is seriously flawed as a moral theory.

Moral flexibility was listed as an advantage of utilitarianism in the previous chapter. Here, however, it can take the shape of a great disadvantage. Utilitarianism does not believe any action to be intrinsically wrong, whether that be rape, torture, or enslavement. Therefore, if an individual thought of themselves as worthless, if society thought so as well, and if both believed they would be better off if he were dead, then utilitarianism requires the killing of such an individual as justifiable homicide.

This point brings up the problem of injustice, which can significantly reduce the appeal of utilitarianism. In specific instances where the misery created by sacrificing an individual does not outweigh the benefits that action brings to the group, utilitarianism requires his killing. This is the case with vicarious and exemplary punishment. It arises because utilitarianism does not necessarily value justice as an intrinsic good. If it did, then the problem of which of happiness and justice is more important would arise whenever they conflicted with each other.

At the end of the chapter, Shafer-Landau presents rule consequentialism, a moral theory that seems to address previous objections to utilitarianism. It states that the moral righteousness of an action is dependent on whether it conforms to an optimific social rule. This means everyone or nearly everyone in a society must accept that act as good. To determine whether a moral rule is acceptable, one must envision a society where everyone endorses it, then ask whether there are competing rules that would generate a better result. If not, then the rule is optimific and ratified. This idea solves the injustice problem because, generally, policies that maximize well-being in the long run will benefit a society much better than short-term actions that yield immediate results. For example, people may prefer to live in a society that categorically bans torture even if it can benefit them in the short term in unusual circumstances. As attractive as this theory may be, utilitarians rarely accept it because it demands people obey rules even when it is more advantageous to break them. Australian philosopher J.J.C. Smart accuses rule consequentialism of irrationality.

Chapter 11 introduces the philosophy of Immanuel Kant (1724–1804), which values justice over maximizing well-being and is the most important opposition to utilitarianism. However, what is moral justice and how can it be measured? Shafer-Landau introduces two general tests: The first one asks “what if everyone did that?” and the second—also called the golden rule—asks “how would you like it if I did that to you?” (161). Both tests are flawed. The first one can deliver contradictory verdicts depending on how an act is described. For example, if homosexual sex is presented as an act that prevents the creation of children, then everyone doing it means the human race would die out, and the act would be considered immoral. However, if it is presented as an enjoyable activity shared between consenting people, then it may be seen as morally acceptable. There is a clear contradiction here. Similarly, the golden rule is flawed when in exceptional circumstances people’s desires clash. For example, a masochist who enjoys feeling pain should not be free to deliver that same pain onto others. It also fails to regulate self-regarding actions (such as self-sacrifice) because they cannot be done onto others.

Kant rejected both these methods of determining morality. In their stead, he proposed the “principle of universalizability” as the ultimate guideline for morality (163). This principle states that “an act is morally acceptable if, and only if, its maxim is universalizable” (163). Kant defines a maxim as the principle that guides an action. It includes a description of the action and a reason for why it was done. Every individual dictates their own maxims. This is important because unlike consequentialism, Kant does not value the results of any action, only their intentions. Morality should strictly depend on elements that can be controlled, such as our own actions.

The desirability of a maxim can be measured through the principle of universalizability. There are three steps to this: First, one must describe their maxim. Then, they must envision a world where everyone supports and follows that maxim. Finally, they must ask themselves whether the goal of their maxim can be achieved in that imagined world. A maxim is universalizable if it passes this test. For example, if someone broke a promise to their friend because it served their own purposes, that act would be deemed immoral because its maxim cannot be universalized. If everyone cheated their friends, promises would be meaningless and nobody would be able to ask their friends for favors in the first place. The maxim’s goal is thus defeated and not universalizable. In sum, Kant’s philosophy ensures that actions deemed moral can potentially be accepted by everyone. It also disregards the concept of maximizing well-being, focusing instead on justice and consistency.

Kant also believed in moral duties as categorical imperatives: They are commands that cannot be ignored or disobeyed by rational people. In other words, ignoring one’s moral duty is irrational. However, this is a difficult concept to defend. The “Amoralist’s Challenge” presents a case where an individual knows right from wrong but cares not to follow moral rules. If that person decides that doing his moral duty will not get him what he wants, then it is rational for him to violate his moral duty. Kant’s reply is to call this a hypothetical imperative: a rational act for the purpose of getting what he wants. Categorical imperatives, however, do not depend on personal desires and preferences. Kant summarizes this in his “Argument for the Irrationality of Immorality.” A person who is rational is consistent and obeys the principle of universalizability. This means they act morally. Thus, acting morally is always rational, and acting immorally is always irrational.

The bulk of the Kantian perspective relies on the principle of universalizability, but this principle is not infallible. For example, a group of extremists (Shafer-Landau provides the example of Nazis) may not be inconsistent in their beliefs and could realistically envision a world in which their maxims were universalizable. The Kantian perspective values integrity the same way utilitarians tout benevolence, but these are not necessarily inherently good unless they are tied to right ethical values. In sum, universalizability does not always yield fair results.

Kantian philosophy does not abide by absolute moral rules since they may clash at times. Determining right from wrong is entirely dependent on how people describe their maxim. Thus, to ban an action, there must first be a way to confirm that none of the maxims tied to it are universalizable.