61 pages • 2 hours read
Russ Shafer LandauThe Fundamentals of Ethics
Nonfiction | Reference/Text Book | Adult | Published in 2009A modern alternative to SparkNotes and CliffsNotes, SuperSummary offers high-quality Study Guides with detailed chapter summaries and analysis of major themes, characters, and more.
Part 2, Chapters 17-18Chapter Summaries & Analyses
Part 2: “Normative Ethics: Doing the Right Thing”
Chapter 17 Summary and Analysis: “Virtue Ethics”
Chapter 17 explores virtue ethics, which claims that moral guidance should come in the shape of moral exemplars, that is, virtuous people. This theory originates from the ancient Greeks in the Western tradition. At its forefront is Aristotle’s work Nicomachean Ethics. According to virtue ethics, an action is considered right if it is performed by a moral exemplar, and it is wrong if the moral exemplar refrains from it. Virtue ethics is part of ethical pluralism: Although it establishes the moral exemplar as the ultimate moral standard, it also believes there are other moral rules that can guide people’s actions. The virtuous exemplar is only called upon when these moral rules clash and people become conflicted about what course of action to take.
Virtue ethicists believe there are no simple rules that determine the morality of any act. The discipline is imprecise, but it is not without logic. To properly understand morality, people first need to acquire moral wisdom. They can achieve this through a combination of life experience, emotional maturity, and intellectual training. Virtue ethicists also believe in the importance of emotions: They can help people determine what is morally important, separate right from wrong, and motivate them to do the right thing.
Aristotle believed that a person’s moral character can only be shaped through a combination of training, experience, and practice. Virtue ethicists inherit this tradition: They firmly believe virtue is learned rather than inborn. There is also some luck involved since a child born to a virtuous family may receive a better moral education. Moral wisdom is therefore gradually acquired through a lifetime, and there are no litmus tests that can evaluate a person’s degree of moral sophistication.
Virtues are defined here as an individual’s character. This definition implies that a virtue is not a mere behavior pattern, but part of a person’s fundamental identity. For example, a stingy person and a generous person will have different perceptions of the world: The generous person might notice people in need whereas the stingy person may not care enough to acknowledge their presence. Their thoughts and motivations might be different, too. The generous person might actively think of ways to help others whereas the stingy person might search for ways to minimize their own contribution. Virtuous people are thus judged on their actions and their inner lives. They lead lives that are fundamentally different from the vicious.
According to virtue ethicists, a life of virtue does not necessarily translate to happiness. They believe each individual should search for an ultimate good that is intrinsically valuable, self-sufficient, and distinctive. However, in doing so, they are on the path to being better off, since human well-being is always shaped by virtues rather than vices. Therefore, even though vicious people may have “more fun,” the virtuous person seeking to possess excellent moral character will always be better off.
The latter half of Chapter 17 observes some common objections to virtue ethics. The first is called the “Argument from Tragic Dilemmas.” It claims that there are cases in which the moral exemplar is faced with two tragic decisions, and no matter which he chooses, they are not morally praiseworthy. The classic example is that of a mother who has to sacrifice one child to let the other live or doom them both to death. In these instances, the moral exemplar’s decision cannot be seen as the correct standard. Therefore, virtue ethics is false. The argument from tragic dilemmas could be challenged by arguing that having the strength of choosing the lesser of two evils demonstrates moral fortitude and may be praiseworthy even if the outcome is less than ideal.
The second objection to virtue ethics claims that it does not help solve moral dilemmas. However, Shafer-Landau reminds readers that this has been the case for every theory thus far. They all require some level of good judgment to interpret their clauses.
The third objection declares that virtue ethics is too demanding. Most moral exemplars are capable of great self-sacrifice. For example, Mohandas Gandhi almost died in a hunger strike to protest British colonial rule. If he is a moral exemplar, then virtue ethics might ask the same standard of character for everyone. Although logical, this argument is not flawless. Virtue ethicists argue that such extreme measures are only appropriate in particular situations: Not every problem should be solved through hunger strikes, and not everyone may find themselves in the right position to employ such a method.
The fourth problem lies in how to select moral exemplars. One solution to this problem is relativism, the idea that role models differ across people and cultures. The other is to select moral exemplars after becoming morally wiser and more insightful. This is far from a perfect answer, but Shafer-Landau once again points out that every other theory faces similar challenges about how to gain moral wisdom.
The fifth problem arises when moral exemplars disagree with one another. If they believe in acting differently in the same situation, then a moral contradiction exists. Virtue ethicists can attempt to solve this problem in two ways. The first is to claim there is only one moral exemplar. The second is to believe all moral exemplars would act the same in any given situation. Shafer-Landau finds both of these cases unconvincing and proposes a third solution. He defines acts as morally required if all moral exemplars agree to it. However, if only some agree to it, then the act is morally permitted. If no moral exemplar would perform it, then that act is morally forbidden. This approach effectively solves the contradiction.
The final objection to virtue ethics is very similar to the divine command theory. According to virtue ethics, an act is morally wrong because a virtuous person would not perform it, not because it is intrinsically wrong. However, all moral exemplars either have a reason for acting a certain way or do not. If they do not have a reason, then their choices are arbitrary, and their acts could hardly serve as a moral standard. If they do have a reason, then it is that reason and not their act that determines moral quality. In other words, while it might be useful to look at moral exemplars for guidance, they do not, by virtue of their actions, imbue morality in neutral actions. In sum, this argument highlights a fatal flaw in virtue ethics.
Chapter 18 Summary and Analysis: “Feminist Ethics”
All moral theories so far have been written by men. Chapter 18 is dedicated to exploring the unique propositions of feminist ethics. It is based on the premise that male philosophers have historically made damaging claims about women while ignoring women’s perspective. Feminist ethics is an approach to moral philosophy that inspired many subsequent theories. It is based on four main clauses: 1) Women are morally equal to men; 2) women’s experiences deserve exploration and will contribute to a more accurate understanding of morality; 3) traditionally feminine traits (such as empathy, mercy, and compassion) deserve as much respect and consideration as traditionally masculine traits (such as independence, personal honor, and competitiveness); and 4) moral reasonings that are traditionally feminine (such as those that value cooperation, flexibility, and connectedness) are generally superior to their traditionally male counterparts (which emphasize impartiality, abstraction, and adherence to rules).
Feminist ethics was popularized in the 1980s. The 1982 publication of In a Different Voice (by Harvard psychologist Carol Gillian garnered a lot of attention and propelled this new philosophical movement forward. Her work argued that women, generally speaking, navigated morality differently from men. Most importantly, Gillian resisted the idea that the traditionally feminine way of moral interpretation was inferior. Shafer-Landau reminds readers that there is no such thing as a female perspective that is universally applicable to all women. Rather, this chapter focuses on highlighting moral qualities that have traditionally been assigned to women and ignored by past philosophers.
One unique angle brought forth by feminist ethics is the issue of dependence. Women have largely been subjugated to men throughout history, and actions performed in a position of vulnerability challenge the traditionally male moral outlook. For example, defending personal rights may be considered virtuous and is easily done by men, but for women who have never been educated and remain financially dependent on their husbands, the task is much more daunting.
Women have also been traditionally assigned as caretakers in the family. An individual’s moral outlook can often depend on family circumstances. Feminist ethics thus highlights moral actions as dependent on factors beyond personal control. Thus, vulnerability, dependency, and connectedness all affect morality. Feminist ethics protest the concept of the isolated and independent moral free agent. This is because all people, including men, operate in a wide network of interpersonal relationships that affect their decision-making.
Since women have traditionally been assigned the role of the caretaker, many of them notice the importance of social service. Without caretakers (such as nurses and mothers), many aspects of society would cease to function properly. Therefore, feminist philosophers have developed a model called the “ethics of care,” which defines acts of service as the base of all moral relations.
Care is defined as an emotion reinforced by other feelings such as “sympathy, empathy, sensitivity, and love” (283). It is not purely an emotional response but involves thinking as well. This is a departure from previous ethical theories, most of which dismiss the necessity of using emotions for moral deliberation. Many proponents of the ethics of care believe they operate within the virtue ethics tradition. This is because they emphasize the method through which actions are performed.
Feminist ethics reject absolutism and monism as pipe dreams. Most sources of moral conflict arise from our relationships with other people. Generally, they are not life-or-death situations and do not have a single correct moral answer. Feminist ethics embrace the messiness of the moral world and posits that recognizing there are no simple answers is part of personal moral development. Further, it rejects Rawls’s veil of ignorance and the utilitarian insistence on impartiality. Feminists believe in appreciating the unique circumstances and complexities of specific situations. In contrast to previous theories, they resist the temptation to generalize rules.
Feminist ethics also value cooperation over competition. For example, a mother–child relationship rarely involves competing for resources. If interpersonal relationships emphasized mutual care, kindness, and reconciliation instead of cutthroat competition, the moral outlook of the world might shift significantly. This is why they also emphasize observing social responsibilities over assessing individual rights. This is because rights are only relevant when that individual is already autonomous and free of coercion, which is traditionally not a benefit extended to women. In sum, feminist ethics “emphasize our responsibilities to others, rather than our rights against them” (287).
The last half of Chapter 18 lists some common challenges for feminist ethics. The first criticizes this approach to morality as being too narrow and restrictive. For example, there is no roadmap that explains how to care for perfect strangers the same way people care for their close relatives. The second criticism is levied against the use of emotions in moral deliberation. Without clear instructions on how to use them, it is unclear when they help and when they hinder the process of assessing morality. The third problem lies in feminist ethics’ dismissal of impartiality. Without an objective mind, judges and other people holding civic responsibilities may err in their verdict. In other words, relativism has its shortfalls. The fourth problem with feminist ethics is their rejection of a supreme moral rule. Without a standard of guidance, feminist ethics can feel scattered and disorderly. The fifth critique points out the limits of cooperation. Not everyone is willing to get along, and competition can be advantageous in certain situations. Finally, some critique feminist ethics as being too dismissive of justice and individual rights since they protect people’s autonomy. Women, especially, have historically needed this type of physical and moral protection. In sum, feminist ethics call for equal consideration for both sexes. This approach to ethics emphasizes care as a traditionally feminine trait and treats women’s perspectives as essential to better understand morality.
