The Fundamentals of Ethics

How can life be good, and how can we improve our well-being? Chapter 1 introduces hedonism as a potential answer to these difficult questions. Hedonism is the belief that happiness is at the core of human welfare. For someone to be better off, they need to increase their happiness. Two factors contribute to an individual’s happiness: instrumental goods and things that are intrinsically valuable. Instrumental goods are devices whose purpose is to bring pleasure. For example, possessing money and consuming goods can be satisfying; money and consumer goods are therefore means through which we can increase our welfare. However, instrumental goods in and of themselves hold no value. Money means nothing to someone who has no use for it. These goods make people better off because they bring about some greater pleasure, such as happiness. In other words, happiness in and of itself can make someone feel better; it is therefore intrinsically valuable.

According to hedonism, happiness is the only intrinsic good that can improve the human condition, and unhappiness is what hinders well-being. The word hedonism comes from the Greek word hédoné, or “pleasure” (24). This happiness can come from two sources: physical pleasure and attitudinal pleasure. Although it is commonly thought that hedonism emphasizes physical pleasure, philosophers who defend this theory rather highlight attitudinal pleasure as the epitome of enjoyment. Instead of seeking temporary physical pleasure, the key to a good life lies in a broader attitude of overall enjoyment, which does not necessarily have to be experienced physically.

Epicurus (341–270 BCE) is commonly referred to as the first great hedonist, and the origins of the doctrine can be traced to him. His philosophy promoted tranquility and inner peace as the ultimate state of happiness. This can be achieved through two avenues: “moderation in all physical matters and intellectual clarity about what is truly important” (25). John Stuart Mill (1806–1873) was a famous hedonist who believed there are different levels of quality to happiness, the most valuable of which is born out of hard work.

Hedonism is an attractive theory because of its flexibility. It allows for people to find their own source of enjoyment and shape their individual paths. Further, it can forge many general rules on how to live a good life while also justifying the exceptional cases. For example, while most people find happiness in security and love, masochists may enjoy humiliation and pain instead. Hedonists claim that if being hurt gives the masochist the most enjoyment, it effectively reduces his misery and therefore he is better off. Physical pain is thus a nonissue as long as enjoyment is present.

However, there are limits to this theory. One famous objection to hedonism comes from contemporary philosopher Philippa Foot. She argues that if happiness is the only source of human well-being and a child can become permanently happy after a lobotomy, then their parents should in every case go forth with the operation. This idea seems highly suspicious and suggests there is more to human welfare than happiness in and of itself. 

Chapter 2 presents seven popular objections to hedonism and their drawbacks. This chapter demonstrates how to practice sound moral reasoning through the use of concrete examples. The first objection is called the “Paradox of Hedonism” (33). It points out that if happiness is the only thing worth pursuing, then it should be rational to pursue it doggedly. However, this is not the case: Oftentimes, the more people seek happiness, the less satisfied they are with their current lot. Therefore, happiness does not exclusively contribute to our well-being. Shafer-Landau believes this argument to be logically sound, but its first premise could be mistake: It might not always be rational to doggedly pursue happiness even if it is the only thing of value. Therefore, the paradox of hedonism only “tells us that aiming directly for happiness is not a smart way to get it” (33).

The second objection to hedonism comes from the “Argument from Evil Pleasures” (34), which says that happiness brought forth from evil deeds cannot be morally equivalent to that generated through decent actions. Therefore, its conclusion is that hedonism is wrong. The central problem with this argument is its faulty logic: Hedonism does not weigh sources of happiness and their moral worth but only states that the same amount of happiness felt by two people is equally beneficial to their respective lives.

The third objection to hedonism is called the “Two Worlds Argument” (35). Originally formulated by British philosopher W. D. Ross (1877–1971), it is the most famous and plausible challenge to hedonism. Ross imagines two worlds containing the same amount of happiness, but one of these worlds is inhabited by virtuous people and the other by vicious people. Provided that hedonism is true, these two worlds must be equally good. However, it is implausible that the vicious world is as good as the virtuous world. Therefore, hedonism cannot be true. This argument shares the same pitfall as the previous one in that its first premise is wrong: Hedonism is not a doctrine that determines the value of collective happiness; therefore, questioning the overall goodness of either world does not fundamentally challenge hedonism.

The fourth objection, the “Argument from False Happiness” (37), states that not all sources of happiness make us equally better off. If hedonism is correct, then we are better off as long as we are happy. However, happiness based on false beliefs can make us worse off. Therefore hedonism cannot be correct. This viewpoint was defended by Harvard philosopher Robert Nozick (1938–2002), who argued that a life lived in happiness in a virtual reality cannot be equally satisfying as a life with equal amounts of happiness lived in the real world. Shafer-Landau finds this argument incredibly compelling, as this argument directly challenges the idea of happiness as the only source of a good life.

The “Argument from Autonomy” elaborates on the previous objection against hedonism (39). It states that autonomy can be intrinsically valuable in the same way as happiness. Shafer-Landau offers Aldous Huxley’s Brave New World as an example of this argument. In the dystopian world of the novel, inhabitants are given a drug called soma to pacify them; although they live in happiness, they lose their autonomy. The argument from autonomy states that hedonism cannot be true because if it were, then autonomy would only contribute to our well-being insofar as it made us happy. Autonomy, however, is intrinsically good and can directly improve our lives. This is a very plausible line of argument, according to Shafer-Landau.

The sixth objection to hedonism is the “Trajectory Argument.” It posits that a life whose trajectory reflects an upward trend must be better than one that reflects a downward trend. An individual who improved his lot in life cannot have the same quality of life as one who was well off at first and later fell into destitution, even if it nominally amounts to the same quantity of happiness. Shafer-Landau finds this argument compelling and offers no critique of it.

The final challenge to hedonism presented in this chapter is the “Argument from Multiple Harms” (42). It states that if hedonism is correct, then only unhappiness can cause us harm. This seems counterintuitive because according to this logic, the lower our baseline for sadness is, the better off we are. If we are genuinely indifferent to the world, we are protected against all harm, and even losing a limb would not hinder our well-being. Just like the arguments from false happiness and autonomy, this argument suggests there are intrinsic values beyond happiness. Shafer-Landau concludes that the main problem of hedonism is that it fails to account for the multiple ways in which someone might be sad: Their misery is a result of losing something intrinsically valuable (such as their autonomy), which may be wholly unrelated to happiness.

Chapter 3 explores the clauses and boundaries of desire satisfaction theory. This theory stipulates that human welfare depends on the extent to which humans’ desires are satisfied. The more an individual can get what they want, the better their life is. Alternatively, the more their desires are frustrated, the more their condition in life declines. Shafer-Landau summarizes it as follows: “[s]omething is intrinsically good for you if it satisfies your desires, only if it satisfies your desires, and because it satisfies your desires” (45).

The desire satisfaction theory is compelling in the same way hedonism is insofar as it offers flexibility for every individual to seek their own path to well-being. This means there can be multiple ways in which to lead a good life. Furthermore, everyone has personal authority over how to satisfy their desires. This idea forms a sharp contrast to any objective theory of human welfare, which identifies specific objects or values as universally desirable for a fulfilling life (46). For example, Plato and Aristotle believed that engaging in philosophical reasoning is always necessary to leading a good life, regardless of one’s inclination (26). According to the desire satisfaction theory, this cannot be true, and those who are forced to study philosophy despite hating the field cannot lead as good a life as those pursuing their true desires.

The First Motivation Argument highlights why people are often wary of objective theories of human welfare. It stipulates that things beneficial to us will motivate us to obtain them. If we are unmotivated to obtain such things, then they cannot truly improve our lives. Objective theories cannot explain why things we are unmotivated to obtain are good for us.

The Second Motivation Argument lies at the core of desire satisfaction theory. It presents intrinsic goods as essential to fulfilling our desires. If our desires can be fulfilled, then we will be motivated to some extent to pursue them. Therefore, if intrinsic goods are essential to desire satisfaction, then they will also motivate us, to some extent, to pursue them. This logical reasoning employs the form of A=B, B=C, therefore A=C. It is logically sound, and its premises are plausible. Shafer-Landau assumes they are true for the time being to dive deeper into the inner workings of desire satisfaction theory.

Another advantage of the desire satisfaction theory is that it answers the perennial question of why self-improvement is important for living a good life. This is illustrated in the Argument for Self-Interest, which stipulates the following:

1. If something makes us better off, then it satisfies our desires.

2. If something satisfies our desires, then we have a reason to obtain it.

3. Therefore, if something makes us better off, then we have reason to obtain it (48).

In other words, as long as an individual is clear about what he wants and also knows how to get it, then he will always be motivated to pursue his self-interests and will automatically be on the path to leading a good life. In sum, there is always a good reason to fulfill our desires, and if this reason makes us better off, we always have a good reason to pursue our self-interests.