The Fundamentals of Ethics

“Especially when so much is at stake—the very quality of our life and our relations with others—it would be terrible to close our minds to new and challenging ideas. Those who have thought so hard about the central questions of existence may well have something to teach us.”

This quote demonstrates the importance of ethical reflection and, by extension, the relevance of the field of ethics. Shafer-Landau cautions readers about falling into the trap of relativism. He reasons that amateurs in the field should remain open-minded about different ethical theories they will encounter, as all of them have been the work of experts.

“There is no widely agreed-on definition of morality. We know that it is centrally concerned with protecting people’s well-being, with fairness, justice, respect for others, virtue, responsibility, rights, liberties, social cooperation, praise, and blame. But the precise nature of such concern is highly disputed, as we’ll soon see.”

This quote illustrates the sheer reach of morality in everyday human affairs and society. It involves all fields in which human action can yield consequences for others.

“Not all arguments are equally good. This is as true in ethics as it is in science, mathematics, or politics. It is easy to mistake one’s way when it comes to ethical thinking. We can land at the wrong conclusion [...]. We can also arrive at the right conclusion by means of terrible reasoning. We must do our best to avoid both of these mistakes.”

Here, Shafer-Landau cautions readers that moral reasoning requires both sound premises and logical reasoning. Without rigorous thinking, the very core of an argument can be mistaken.

“Happiness, understood from now on as enjoyment, is indeed a good candidate for an intrinsic value. It’s not like a vaccination or a chocolate bar. If such things generate no benefits [...] then there is nothing valuable about them. [...] Happiness isn’t like that. It is worth pursuing for its own sake.”

This sentence defines the core belief of hedonism, the view that only happiness is of intrinsic value. It differentiates between instrumental goods, which are only useful for us if they bring about some positive effect, and things that have innate value beyond their function.

“With happiness however, this completely backfires—those who try really hard to make themselves happier almost never succeed. Philosophers call this the paradox of hedonism.”

This quote highlights one of the many arguments levied at hedonism. Although it does not challenge happiness as an intrinsic value, it does successfully demonstrate happiness is not obtainable by simply reaching for it.

“If the desire theory is right, then each of us has the final say on what makes our life go well, because it’s our own desires that determine how well we are faring.”

At the core of the desire satisfaction theory is the belief that our welfare is decided by how well we are able to fulfill our wishes. This statement demonstrates the flexibility of the theory: Everyone has different desires, but they can all be equally well off if they satisfy them.

“If you are told from the cradle that your greatest ambition should be to serve your master, then you may well end up with no desire any stronger than that. If desire fulfillment is the measure of a good life, then such lives can be very good indeed. That doesn’t seem right.”

This is a vivid example of how the desire satisfaction theory can be flawed. If people are conditioned or forced to desire only the very minimum, they are considered to lead satisfactory lives as much as anyone else. This is because other ideals such as freedom and individuality are not considered to possess intrinsic value in the desire satisfaction theory.

“We aren’t going to try to determine here whether God exists. Nor are we going to explore the specific doctrines that separate one religion from another. Instead, I want to take a step back and examine three central assumptions that underlie the widespread view that morality depends on religion.”

This quote sets the tone for much of the rest of the book. Morality, as shown and proven by Shafer-Landau, can exist independently from religion, and the status of God’s existence is irrelevant. The Fundamentals of Ethics is a secular account of moral philosophy that defends moral philosophy as a valid field independent from theology.

“Animals live good lives when their nature is fulfilled, and bad lives when it isn’t. A racehorse, by nature, is built for speed. [...] Chameleons naturally blend in with their background. When fillies break a leg, or chameleons cannot camouflage themselves, their lives go poorly.”

This is the basis of natural law theory, which posits the existence of a human nature that should guide all human actions. Fulfilling human nature is moral, and ignoring it is immoral.

“[...] [W]e are always looking out for Number One. If we had the power to do as we liked, we would always seek out our own best interests, no matter the harms we caused.”

This sentence summarizes the basic view of psychological egoism. It states that human beings, at their core, are selfish and only wish to improve their personal condition. Altruism does not exist, according to psychological egoists.

“In a perfect world, virtue would always be rewarded and vice would never flourish. But what should we do, here in our imperfect world, when immorality promises great rewards? [...] If ethical egoism is true, there are no such cases.”

Ethical egoism, as illustrated in this quote, views self-fulfilling actions as always morally right. The unconventional conclusion of this theory is that there can never be conflict between self-interest and morality.

“Do all the good you can, by all the means you can, in all the ways you can, in all the places you can, at all the times you can, to all the people you can, as long as ever you can.”

This pronouncement is attributed to founder of the Methodist Church, John Wesley. Shafer-Landau shares this quote from the English religious thinker because it illustrates the goal of utilitarianism: to maximize the amount of good in the world.

“If happiness were all-important, then we could always give the nod to it. If autonomy were the supreme value, we could insist on honoring it, even at the cost of unhappiness. But if the two are both of ultimate importance, then it is very hard to know what to do if they conflict.”

This quote illustrates a common problem with monistic moral theories. Since they only argue for the existence of a single fundamental value, allowing any other condition to possess intrinsic value is bound to create conflict.

“People are inconsistent to the extent that they treat similar cases differently. Tax cheats or dirty politicians are in the same boat as the rest of us. There’s nothing special about them, or their situation, that exempts them from the rules that everyone must follow.”

This passage paves the way for the introduction of Kantian ethics, which values consistency as a demonstration of moral rationality. It also demonstrates how it can be objectionable to make an exception of oneself for the sake of self-fulfillment.

“Is there anything wrong with slavery? This probably sounds like an idiotic question. Of course slavery is wrong. So let me rephrase my question. Is there anything wrong, in and of itself, with enslaving other people? [...] Richard Hare [...] defended the utilitarian view that denied that slavery is intrinsically wrong.”

This opening sentence of Chapter 12 illustrates how moral philosophy, as a discipline, seriously interrogates even the most basic moral assumptions of society. It invites reflection about how some theories, such as utilitarianism, may allow the existence of some forms of slavery while others, such as Kantian ethics (as shown later), cannot.

“We can’t prove that these assumptions are true. But that doesn’t make them illegitimate. Why not? Because the fundamental starting points in every area of thinking are beyond proof. It turns out, for instance, that the basic assumption behind all scientific inquiry—that there is a physical world outside our own mind—cannot be proven.”

Here Shafer-Landau argues there is no reason to make an exception for the basic assumptions of the discipline of ethics and assume they are false. Although this argument is not foolproof, it does provide a counterargument for ethical skepticism.

“Proceduralism tells us that we should not begin moral inquiry by assuming, say, that slavery is wrong or that generosity is right. Make no moral assumptions at this stage. Instead, follow the correct procedure, and then see what the outcome is. Provided you’ve been careful, you’ll land on the right answer to your moral question.”

On the surface, this is a clear demonstration of how to go about proceduralism. However, it also shows the field of moral philosophy can begin from a blank state by setting aside pre-existing notions of what is considered right and wrong. The author later explains that this is the starting point for the social contract theory.

“The social contract that fixes our basic moral duties is not one that any of us has actually consented to; rather, it is one that we each would agree to were we all free and rational and seeking terms of mutually beneficial cooperation. So the fact that we have never signed a social contract or verbally announced our allegiance to one does not undermine the contractarian project.”

Shafer-Landau defends Hobbes’s social contract theory here by illustrating how, without having signed any agreement, we may still be inclined to obey basic moral (or legal) rules. This is because they may already be optimized to bring us the greatest benefit for the least sacrifice.

“Ross’s position also easily explains the widespread belief that the moral rules may sometimes acceptably be broken. There is always something to be said in favor of keeping a promise—but I should break my promise to meet a student for coffee if my daughter has a medical emergency and needs to be taken to the hospital.”

This quote explains why absolute moral rules are incredibly difficult to defend in exceptional scenarios. This is precisely why Ross’s moral pluralism can at times be considered more flexible than monist theories.

“Rather than begin with a theory of moral duty, we would start with a picture of the good life and the good person, and define our duty by reference to these ideals. That is precisely what virtue ethics recommends.”

Here the author introduces virtue ethics, which begins by identifying a virtuous person and deriving what morality looks like from his or her actions. This starting point is a departure from the other theories explored so far, but that is because virtue ethics is rather unpopular among experts. It suffers from a fundamental contradiction, as demonstrated by the divine command theory.

“The most prominent authors and supporters of the ethical theories that we have considered so far have one thing in common. They are all men. Most of them lived in societies that systematically discriminated against women.”

This quote introduces the chapter on feminist ethics. Shafer-Landau cautions that male thinkers overwhelmingly dominate the field of ethics. In introducing female authors to The Fundamentals of Ethics, he brings a long overlooked perspective to the table.

“Subjectivism and relativism occupy a middle ground between moral nihilism and ethical objectivism. There are legitimate moral standards (contrary to nihilism), but their legitimacy depends crucially on our support (contrary to objectivism).”

This passage effectively positions these moral attitudes on a metaphorical line, serving to illustrate each attitude toward the existence of morality. On one end, nihilism categorically denies its existence, and on the other end, objectivism posits there are fundamental moral rules. In the middle are subjectivism and relativism.

“According to nihilists, there is a rigid fact-value distinction, which basically says that there is a sharp difference between facts and values. As nihilists see things, values are on the wrong side of the divide. Facts exist; values don’t.”

Here, Shafer-Landau summarizes the basic assumption of moral nihilism, which sees values and facts as fundamentally different. Without this fact–value distinction, nihilism would lack a solid basis of argumentation and would therefore be illogical and indefensible.