The Dictator's Handbook: Why Bad Behavior is Almost Always Good Politics

“The prime mover of interests in any state (or corporation for that matter) is the person at the top—the leader. So we started from this single point: the self-interested calculations and actions of rules are the driving force of all politics.”

Journalists, authors, and academics often explain politics in terms of community or national interest and welfare. Bueno de Mesquita and Smith argue against this explanation. Instead, they believe that the self-interests of leaders drive politics. Leaders only care about getting into power and then staying in power. All their choices and actions come back to this basic desire to maintain their political survival. 

“No one rules alone; no one has absolute authority. All that varies is how many backs have to be scratched and how big the supply of backs available for scratching.”

Bueno de Mesquita and Smith do not agree that rulers, even monarchs and dictators, rule alone. Instead, leaders must successfully navigate three political groups if they want to stay in power. These groups are the nominal selectorate (interchangeables), the real selectorate (influentials), and the winning coalition (essentials). The composition of these three groups within a state or organization dictates the constraints leaders face.

“Lest there be any doubt that those who share the risks of coming to power often are then thrown aside—or worse—let us reflect on the all-too-typical case of the backers of Fidel Castro’s revolution in Cuba. Of the twenty-one ministers appointed by Castro in January 1959, immediately after the success of his revolution, twelve had resigned or had been ousted by the end of the year. Four more were removed in 1960 as Castro further consolidated his hold on power.”

The authors use this example to illustrate a key point of politics: Challengers might make promises to their supporters that they will have positions of power in their government, but it is a political promise that might not be honored in the long run. Many of Fidel Castro’s most intimate backers were either exiled or executed as he consolidated his power in Cuba. The most famous case in point is Che Guevara. Che was second in power only to Castro himself. Likely as a result, Castro forced Che out of Cuba in 1965 after he went from being a supporter to a rival in Castro’s mind. Che was ultimately killed in Bolivia. There are numerous examples of political transitions around the world in which leaders replaced supporters who helped them come to power.

“Would-be autocrats must be prepared to kill all comers—even members of the immediate family.”

Politics is not for the faint of heart, especially in systems dominated by few essentials. To come to power, autocrats and monarchs must often physically remove, including killing, their opponents, who are sometimes immediate family members. Extreme conditions of fear and insecurity that accompany transitions in autocracies and monarchies are likely why murder is one of the favored solutions for consolidating power.

“Autocratic politics is a battle for private rewards. Democratic politics is a battle for good policy ideas.”

This passage explains one of the key differences between how autocrats and democrats come into power. In autocracies, challengers only come to power if they can offer greater private rewards to essential supporters of the current leaders than those that essentials currently receive. In democracies, challengers come to power by having more popular policy ideas than the current leader. In doing so, they can detach supporters from the ruling coalition. Since democrats need such large numbers of supporters to win elections, challengers can thus strengthen their position and weaken the current leader’s advantage.

“The three most important characteristics of a coalition are: (1) Loyalty; (2) Loyalty; (3) Loyalty.”

Loyalty is the most important characteristic of a coalition. After coming to power, leaders must surround themselves with loyal supporters to stay in power. To consolidate power, new leaders will often purge their initial coalition to reduce its size and ensure the members are loyal. Initial coalition purges are often fatal, especially in small-coalition governments. For example, when Adolf Hitler became chancellor of Germany in 1933, he ordered the assassination of at least 85 people who were his original supporters. Successful leaders in the business world must also get rid of ambitious supporters, although this is not usually a violent process. If a business leader fails to do this, then they can be removed from their position.

“Building a small coalition is key to survival. The smaller the number of people to whom a leader is beholden the easier it is for her to persist in office.”

The first rule to rule by is that leaders must keep their coalition as small as possible. Autocrats are more easily able to do this than democrats. Once autocrats reshape and purge some of their initial supporters, they can more easily buy their supporters’ loyalty with rewards. Democrats are typically not able to physically remove supporters. Instead, they must continue coming up with policy ideas that keep their large group of supporters loyal. Because supporters are not tied to private rewards, other potential democratic leaders can persuade them to their campaign through better policy ideas than the current leader. As a result, democrats are much less likely to survive in office for 10 years or more than autocrats.

“‘Knowing where the money is’ is particularly important in autocracies—and particularly difficult.”

Bueno de Mesquita and Smith’s third rule to rule by is that leaders need to control the treasury. This rule is especially important in autocracies because secrecy usually cloaks the financial system. While leaders must pay their supporters, they often do not keep financial records. This lack of transparency is by design. Leaders understand that once other possible challengers know where the treasury is, their political survival is at risk. Secrecy also allows leaders to pay coalition members just enough. Since coalition members do not know how much is in the actual treasury, they are unwilling to negotiate for a higher reward out of fear of replacement. This practice is common not just in autocracies but in all small-coalition systems, including publicly traded firms.

“Ruling is about staying in power, not about good governance. To this end, leaders buy support by rewarding their essential backers relative to others. Taxation plays a dual role in generating this kind of loyalty. First it provides leaders with the resources to enrich their most essential supporters. Second, it reduces the welfare of those outside the coalition.”

One of the central tenets of The Dictator’s Handbook is that ruling is about staying in power, not about good governance. The authors use taxation to illustrate this theme. In both autocracies and democracies, taxation is about rewarding supporters to the detriment of those outside the coalition. Leaders in both systems redistribute wealth generated from taxes to their essential backers. The manner in which this is done differs between the two political forms. Autocrats will give private rewards to their supporters. Democrats will fund public policies that garner them the most support. Democrats cannot raise taxes as much as autocrats. If democrats raise taxes too much to pay for their policies, their supporters can easily defect to another leader with similar policies at lower costs.

“Debt forgiveness simply allows autocratic leaders to start borrowing more money.”

The authors strongly believe that debt forgiveness is a misguided policy. Those in favor of forgiving debt argue that doing so helps the less well-off members of a country since the debt burden typically falls on them. Bueno de Mesquita and Smith concur that people from lower socioeconomic backgrounds typically face the heaviest burdens from debt. However, they do not believe that forgiving debt improves the quality of life for the masses overall. Data from countries like Ethiopia, Yemen, and Belarus demonstrate that debt forgiveness without institutional reform simply allows autocrats to begin borrowing again, thus continuing to make the lives of the everyday citizens miserable.

“The most reliable means to a good life for ordinary people remains the presence of institutional incentives in the form of dependence on a big coalition that compels power-seeking politicians to govern for the people.”

Bueno de Mesquita and Smith underscore that big coalitions save lives throughout Chapter 5. Leaders of large-coalition systems understand that they must institute policies that protect everyday citizens. Failure to do so puts them at risk of being ousted from office by someone who will. Public goods overwhelmingly improve public well-being in democratic systems. In contrast, autocrats implement only the bare minimum of public goods that helps workers so they can continue working. Life in autocracies is generally bleaker and more miserable than life in democracies for everyday citizens.

“The world’s 36 governments that depend on the largest groups of essentials have thirty-one fewer infant deaths per 1,000 births than the forty-four governments that depend on the smallest groups of essentials. Comparing the same eighty countries but now based on per capita income, the poorest have fifteen more infant deaths per 1,000 births than the richest. Being rich does facilitate saving babies’ lives but not as much as being democratic.”

This passage illustrates a key point: Rulers only care about what helps them stay in power now. While infant mortality rates are extremely high in poorer countries compared to their wealthier counterparts, they are even higher in small-coalition versus large-coalition systems. In autocracies, leaders only value the people that will keep them in power. While they allocate most of their resources to their supporters, they also provide some resources to workers so they can keep working and filling the leader’s treasury. While infants will be valuable for the labor force in the future, they do not help autocratic leaders stay in power now. Thus, these leaders place little value on reducing infant mortality in their countries.

“Yet precious few successful leaders are motivated primarily by the desire to do good works on behalf of their subjects. Everyone likes to be liked, and there’s no reason to think that the powerful have anything against being beloved and honored by their people. Indeed, it could well be the case that there are many candidates for office who pursue power with the intention of being benevolent leaders. The problem is that doing what is best for the people can be awfully bad for staying in power.”

This passage underscores one of the central tenets of the book: Ruling is about staying in power and not good governance. Leaders might set out intending to improve the lives of the people, but they quickly realize that they need to reward their supporters if they want to stay in power. One key private reward is corruption. Corrupt practices are found in both small- and large-coalition systems. In small-coalition systems, such rewards typically come in the form of money. Public policies designed for specific groups are a form of private rewards in large-coalition systems. In all political systems, there will always be people outside of the coalition who therefore never see benefits from the leader’s rule.

“People support leaders who deliver policies that specifically benefit them. That’s why earmarks—pork in colloquial terms—are reviled in general and beloved by each constituency when the money goes to them.”

Bueno de Mesquita and Smith demonstrate that private rewards happen not just in autocracies, but also in democracies. In democracies, political parties carve out niches for themselves. These niches often diverge along policy ideas (e.g., reduce taxes on the rich versus raise taxes on the rich). To come to power, leaders need to craft policy ideas that their constituents like to get them out to vote. Once in office, leaders need to implement some of these ideas so that their constituents remain happy and the leader can stay in power. These policies are known as pork-barrel programs and refer to politicians spending taxpayer money on their supporters to generate loyalty. These policy ideas are often unliked by people outside the leader’s group of supporters.

“Since just twenty-four members of FIFA’s executive committee determine the location of the finals, the winner requires the support of only thirteen members—if that. For the December 2010 vote only twelve voters were required after two members were suspended for allegedly trying to sell their votes. One of these members, Amos Adamu, was caught asking for an $800,000 bribe in a sting operation by the Sunday Times newspaper. While the money was nominally for building artificial pitches, the deal required that $800,000 be paid directly to him.”

This example shows that corruption as a private reward is not unique to government but applies to all organizations, especially when they rely on a small group of essentials. Bueno de Mesquita and Smith compare the International Federation of Association Football (FIFA) with the International Olympic Committee (IOC). Bribes in exchange for votes also occurs with the IOC. A key difference between the two organizations, however, is the size of the bribe. The IOC bribes are usually much smaller, ranging between $100,000 and $200,000 versus $800,000 in the FIFA example. To the authors, this difference is due to FIFA having a smaller number of essentials than the IOC. As the number of supporters grows, private rewards become too costly. To solve the rampant corruption in both organizations, the authors recommend expanding their number of supporters.

“Herein lies the basis for making foreign aid deals. Each side has something to give that the other side holds dear. A democrat wants policies his people like, and the autocrat wants cash to pay off his coalition.”

In Chapter 7, Bueno de Mesquita and Smith dispel the myth that foreign aid is about alleviating poverty. Instead, democratic leaders offer something the autocratic leader wants and vice versa. Typically, the democratic leader wants a favor or policy change that is popular with their constituents. By giving aid to the autocratic leader, the democratic leader can demonstrate to their constituents that they are doing something favorable, thus maintaining their constituents’ support. Autocratic leaders want the aid money to pay off their coalitions so that they too stay in power. 

“Aid is a tool for buying influence and policy. Unless we the people really value development and are willing to make meaningful sacrifices towards those ends then aid will continue to fail in it stated goals. Democrats are not thuggish brutes. They just want to keep their jobs, and to do so they need to deliver the policies their people want. Despite the idealistic expressions of some, all too many of us prefer cheap oil to real changes in West Africa or the Middle East. So we really should not complain too much when our leaders try to deliver what we want. That, after all, is what democracy is about.”

Big coalitions constrain democratic leaders to do the right thing, but at home. These domestic constraints often lead democratic leaders to exploit people in other countries. For this reason, citizens of democratic countries should accept blame for the countless foreign aid policy failures. Democratic leaders are simply doing what their people at home want. If people in donor countries truly wanted to see change in developing countries, they must be willing to sacrifice some of their own comforts, such as cheap gas.

“Before deciding to gamble on the promises of revolutionaries, each prospective demonstrator must judge the costs and the risks of rebellion to be tolerable relative to the conditions expected without rebellion and relative to the gains expected with a successful uprising.”

For a rebellion to be successful, the everyday people must truly believe that the uprising will induce change in their country that will improve their lives. Life under an autocratic ruler is often miserable. People lack access to basic public goods and freedoms. Yet, they also recognize that unsuccessful rebellions can make their lives even worse-off. Thus, everyday people must decide if the rebellion is worth the costs.

“A prudent dictator nips rebellion in the bud.”

Throughout The Dictator’s Handbook, the authors note that being a leader is not for the faint of heart. This sentiment is especially the case when it comes to rebellions in autocracies. Autocratic leaders must be willing to use extremely nasty behaviors to suppress uprisings. If these leaders are unwilling to do so, they will lose their power. For example, when the Iranian people took to the streets following the June 2009 presidential election, the regime quickly stepped in. Its cronies beat, arrested, and killed protesters. These fear tactics quelled the rebellion.

“An earthquake alone does not threaten the survival of democrats. However, if there are more than 200 people killed by the quake then a democratic leader is almost certain to be removed from office. Under normal circumstance, any democrat has a 40 percent chance of being ousted from office in any two-year period. But for a democrat whose country suffered 200 or more deaths in an earthquake, those odds rise to 91 percent.”

The authors illustrate in Chapter 8 that letting people die after natural disasters is good governance in autocracies. Resources spent saving the lives of everyday people cannot be spent on the autocratic leader’s supporters. Moreover, these deaths often increase the aid autocratic leaders receive from foreign governments, which increases the wealth they can give to their backers. In contrast, letting people die from natural disasters is bad governance in democracies. People in democracies view these deaths as policy failures. They are less willing to vote for the democratic leader. As a result, democratic leaders who face high death rates from natural disasters often lose their reelection campaigns.

“War is often said to transcend everyday politics, to be above the fray of partisan rancor. But the fact is that war is inherently political.”

Bueno de Mesquita and Smith strongly disagree with the notion that war is about national interests and power balance. Instead, they believe war is inherently political, meaning autocratic and democratic leaders go to war to stay in power. The authors acknowledge that this is a cynical view of war. However, they hope that by showing war as another pathology of politics, we will learn how to prevent war from happening.

“Democratic leaders profess a desire for democratization. Yet, the reality is that it is rarely in their interest.”

In this passage, the authors take aim at the notion that democracies are angels compared to autocracies. Democratic leaders and their people often express a desire to help democratize autocratic-leaning countries. This belief often stays in the abstract and rarely materializes to on-the-ground changes. Democratic leaders prefer autocratic leaders since they more easily follow their policy preferences and favors. Once autocratic leaders transition to democratic leaders, they will have to follow their people’s wishes, and not their own, to stay in power. Thus, they become much harder for democratic leaders to control. Similarly, the people of democratic countries prefer for other nations to do what they want rather than be what they are. In the end, it is the everyday people in autocracies who suffer from the policies of both their autocratic leaders and democratic countries.

“A fix is not a fix unless it can actually be done! What can be done must satisfy the needs of everyone required to implement change. Wishful thinking is not a fix and a perfect solution is not our goal and should not be any well-intentioned person’s goal.”

The authors start Chapter 10 with a warning: A change will not be perfect, but it needs to make everyone happy. Once of the reasons that changes do not happen in autocratic regimes is that the leader and their supports are usually negatively impacted by the change. For there to be actual change, the policy needs to include something that all of the political groups can support. Failure to do so will mean there is no change at all, which does not improve the people’s lives.