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58 pages 1 hour read

Amin Maalouf

The Crusades Through Arab Eyes

Nonfiction | Book | Adult | Published in 1983

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Part 1Chapter Summaries & Analyses

Part 1, Chapter 1 Summary

The Sultanate of Rūm stretched across much of Asia Minor and was first to receive word of the Franj (Franks/French) arrival in the east in July 1096, according to the Muslim historian, Ibn al-Qalānisi. The Turks had recently taken this realm from the Byzantine Empire under the Sultan Kilij Arslan’s father. Nicaea became the capital of this new Turkish kingdom, which still teemed with churches and had a large Greek population that wished to return to Byzantine hands. Turkish mercenaries serving in the Byzantine army informed Kilij Arslan about the Europeans’ arrival. They comprised a band of women, children, and the impoverished elderly, led by Peter the Hermit, and wore crosses sewn onto their garments.

The Byzantines allowed them to cross the Bosphorus and “Wherever they passed, they were heard to proclaim that they had come to exterminate the Muslims, although they were also seen to plunder many a Greek church on the way” (5). Informers reported that there were thousands whom the Byzantine emperor established at a camp near Nicaea.

This ragtag band of peasants eventually left the camp and headed toward Nicaea, seizing surpluses from the Christian villages along the way and slaughtering those who resisted. They clashed with the Turks at a nearby fort, called Xerigordon, where Turkish forces trapped them and cut off their water supply. Some surrendered while the Turks killed the rest. Nevertheless, a large force of Crusaders remained, so Kilij Arslan ambushed and slaughtered them: “The rest of the Franj, probably nearly twenty thousand of them, were exterminated” (8).

The victory, however, was hollow. Kilij Arslan dismissed later reports about Frankish reinforcement, focusing instead on local conflicts with rival Muslim leaders. Fragmentation set in after the initial foundation of the Seljuk Turkish empire in 1071: “There was no hint of solidarity among the Seljuk cousins: to survive you had to kill” (10). For example, Kilij Arslan vied with a rival emir in the Anatolian highlands of Asia Minor called Danishmend the Wise. When the Franj returned in 1097, however, they made it to the walls of Nicaea with Byzantine support. The two were forced to call a truce.

Kilij Arslan lost Nicaea and was forced to retreat to a new base at Konya in the east. Nicaea’s conquest had ripple effects, for the Turks lost access to western Asia Minor. Kilij Arslan called for jihad, according to the surviving sources, and worked to secure an alliance with Danishmend: “[I]t was now imperative that the Turkish forces of Asia Minor unite, as if forming elements of a single army” (15). The Franj intended to continue beyond Nicaea, with the conquest of Jerusalem as their primary goal. The Turkish forces planned to ambush the Europeans at a narrow pass near Dorylaeum, but the Franj put up a stunning defense and reinforcements arrived to assist the Crusaders. Kilij Arslan, Danishmend, and other emirs fled while the Franj encircled and slaughtered their troops. The Crusaders then turned their attention to Antioch.

Part 1, Chapter 2 Summary

Antioch’s emir, Yaghi-Sīyān, expelled the city’s Christian men so they could not ally with the Crusaders. The Franj could only overrun the city’s walls if they found accomplices from within. One Muslim historian recounts that the emir provided protection for their families after their expulsion. Antioch’s army was vastly outnumbered, but the city was well-fortified with an impressive supply of surplus food. He could not depend on regional allies for military support because others did not face direct Frankish threat,

and it was not necessarily bad for his neighbors if Yaghi-Sīyān was in a spot of trouble […] But he never imagined that his coreligionists would go so far as to hand him over, bound hand and foot, to the mercenaries of the basileus [Byzantine emperor]. (22)

The war between two brothers, Ridwān of Aleppo and Duqāq of Damascus, paralyzed Syria. Ridwān was wed to Yaghi-Sīyān’s daughter and closest to Antioch, but also wanted control over his father-in-law’s kingdom. Yaghi-Sīyān therefore turned to Duqāq. He agreed to bring his army from Damascus north to Antioch, but he turned back along the way after he failed to attack a foraging Crusading army with any success. Spies reported to the emir that the Franj were on the verge of famine with hundreds already dead.

Torrential rain and periodic earthquakes terrified the invaders, some of whom deserted. Yaghi-Sīyān appealed to Ridwān for help; he agreed since the Franj were pillaging his lands. The Franj and Syrian forces met in February 1098 with the Muslim party seeming to have the advantage: “What no one knew was that the battle was lost before it even began. Terrified by what he knew about the fighting abilities of the Franj, Ridwān dared not take advantage of his numerical superiority” (25). He was already on the defensive. The Franj destroyed the Aleppan army. Yaghi-Sīyān ordered his troops to retreat to Antioch’s protective walls when he heard the news. He soon appealed to the atabag of Mosul, Karbūqa, who viewed this request as an opening to extend his influence in Syria. Antioch awaited his arrival while the city suffered under the Franks’ blockade.

Karbūqa, however, failed to provide his promised support swiftly when he heard that the Franj had seized Edessa: “He would first head north and settle the problem of Edessa in a few days; then he would be able to engage the besiegers of Antioch without risk” (30). He laid siege to the city for three weeks to no avail before departing for Antioch. Meanwhile, Fīrūz, an Armenian Muslim charged with overseeing defense of the city’s towers, defected to the Franj and arranged for them to overcome the defenses. Yaghi-Sīyān fled, with historian Ibn al-Athīr reporting his distress. The Crusaders ravaged the city. Yaghi-Sīyān’s son, Sham al-Dawla, now helmed the resistance. He “barricaded himself in a citadel with a small group of fighters” (33). The Franj could not penetrate it, so they formed a “security zone” (33) around the perimeter.

Karbūqa’s forces arrived and trapped the Franks, though his late arrival produced fissures among the emirs. Duqāq of Damascus was the source of this dissent, holding that Karbūqa was the true threat and did not foresee the Crusaders forming kingdoms in the east. Karbūqa soon removed Shams from commanding the citadel and relations broke down.

Meanwhile, the Crusaders depleted their pillaged food stores, leaving them weakened, but the miraculous discovery of the “Holy Lance” soon revived them. Muslim soldiers abandoned the campaign, and Karbūqa appealed to the Crusaders for a truce, which destroyed his reputation among the remaining troops. The Crusaders ignored his plea and advanced, routing his forces and leaving Syria defenseless.

Part 1, Chapter 3 Summary

The Crusaders arrived at the inconspicuous, undefended city of Ma`arra after Antioch’s defeat in 1098. The city resisted the siege for several weeks before contacting Bohemond, the Frankish ruler of Antioch. He agreed to spare them if they relented. They agreed, but the Franj nonetheless unleashed a bloodbath, documented in both Frankish and Muslim chronicles. Surviving sources even describe the Crusaders engaging in cannibalism. Indeed, an extant epistle from the Frankish barons to the papacy relays news of such behavior but blames it on famine. Maalouf asserts, “But the explanation seems unconvincing, for the inhabitants of the Ma`arra region witnessed behavior during that sinister winter that could not be accounted for by hunger” (39).

This affair generated a “chasm” (40) between the European Christian and Islam worlds that persisted for generations, terrorizing the people of the region. The surrounding emirs failed to resist the Crusaders as they traveled southward. Instead, they lavished them with gifts and sent emissaries to negotiate good relations. The Sultan of Shayzar, for example, provided them with guides. Peasants fled in fear as the Franj approached Jerusalem. The Crusaders seized the citadel, Hisn al-Akrād, along the Mediterranean coast, where embassies flooded in with lavish offerings: “No prince, no notable, no qādi, could indulge in the slightest gesture of resistance without placing his entire community in danger” (41). The ruler of flourishing Tripoli entered negotiations with the Franks, which was a fatal mistake.

The European delegation was impressed with the principality’s wealth. By February they began besieging Tripoli’s second biggest city. Tripoli’s ruler, Jalāl al-Mulk, now realized that his realm might fall. ‘Arqa’s inhabitants put up a dogged defense and the Crusaders eventually retreated. The Crusaders marched south again, crossing the River of the Dog, thus initiating conflict with the Fatimids in Egypt.

The vizier in Egypt, al-Afdal, had not been displeased when he learned of the Crusaders’ successes in Syria, due to his rivalry with the Seljuks: “Since the middle of the century, Seljuk advances had been eroding the territory of the Fatimid caliphate and the Byzantine Empire alike” (45). This made the Fatimids and Byzantines natural allies. Both hoped to recover lands the Seljuks had taken. The vizier sent a delegation to the Europeans that proposed they split Syria between them. However, The Crusaders quibbled over control of Jerusalem and would not come to an agreement. Al-Afdal was perplexed.

Al-Afdal decided to launch a surprise attack after Antioch’s fall and Karbūqa’s rout. He successfully conquered Jerusalem after 40 days. Victory was short-lived, however, because the Franks continued their March toward the Holy City. He appealed to Byzantines for help, but Emperor Alexius had no power over the Franj who were now acting independently. Al-Afdal reached out to the Crusaders again. He promised Christian pilgrims could visit sites in Jerusalem whenever they wished and promised freedom of religion. The Crusaders, however, declared war and responded that they would conquer the city. When the Europeans arrived at the walls of Jerusalem, they began building siege warfare machines and breached the walls.

Intense fighting erupted within. The Egyptian general negotiated terms of surrender that included protection for himself and his men. Ibn al-Athir writes that the Franks spent the next week massacring the city’s Muslim population. The Crusaders sacked the sacred mosque of `Umar and slaughtered Jewish inhabitants when they burned down a synagogue. They expelled eastern clergy from the Church of the Holy Sepulchre and arrested and tortured the priests who refused to tell them where the relic of the True Cross was hidden. The Crusaders, led by Godfrey of Boullion, Jerusalem’s new ruler, set out for Ascalon when they learned of al-Afdal’s advance. The clash ended in the Fatimid force’s defeat.

Meanwhile, al-Harawi stormed into the mosque of Baghdad, where he sought to shock his fellow Muslims into resistance. The young caliph, al-Mustazhir Billāh, was uninterested and powerless to help the Syrian refugees who appealed for help: “They [the Abbasid caliphs] were no more than hostages in the hands of their Turkish or Persian soldiers, who were able to make or break sovereigns at will […] To escape that fate, most of the caliphs renounced any political activity” (54). Political fragmentation thus paralyzed the Muslim world while the Franj consolidated power.

Part 1 Analysis

The first three chapters of Maalouf’s book center the First Crusade, the reasons for its success, and the early responses—or lack thereof—from Muslim leaders. Maalouf will revisit these issues in his Epilogue, where he suggests they contributed to a long decline of culture and intellectual development in the Islamic world and the West’s ascendency as the center of modernity.

Maalouf argues that Muslims saw the Crusaders as a monolithic force deemed the “Franj” since most of the original Crusaders were Frankish, hailing from what became a unified medieval kingdom of France by the late Middle Ages. He gives little attention to the first two “waves” of this Crusade. The first was the People’s Crusade headed by Peter the Hermit, which Maalouf notes was not clearly understood by the Seljuks, and which ended in failure. The second wave consisted of a group led by a German count that did not make it out of Europe. Instead, these Crusaders engaged in an antisemitic massacre of central European Jews before the Hungarians rebuffed them.

Maalouf’s primary concern is the third wave led by the French nobility, which succeeded in carving out several Crusader states in the East and conquered Jerusalem, their goal since Crusading was a Christian holy war. Maalouf gives particular attention to the Crusaders’ brutality, like their cannibalism at Ma`arra, which he doubts was an act of desperation, as the Western primary sources claim. Maalouf instead asserts that Muslim oral tradition preserved the truth of this atrocity, which is speculation.

Maalouf’s focus on the circumstances at Ma`arra highlights The Links Between Crusade History and Contemporary Politics by emphasizing the Westerners’ barbarity and cruelty. This Western barbarism is oft overlooked in popular Western media that emphasizes the supposed incivility of the Arab world. Maalouf, however, turns his Western audience’s focus to the Crusaders’ abhorrent behavior, and by calling into question their reasons for engaging in cannibalism, Maalouf centers the violence of Christian holy war.

He likewise underscores Crusading as a Multi-Ethnic Religious Conflict when he introduces the Crusaders’ religious zealotry and their slaughter of fellow Christians and Jews in the city. Muslim residents were perplexed by the religious procession that preceded the Frankish assault:

[T]hey had begun by organizing a procession around the walls, led by bare-headed praying and chanting priests; they then threw themselves against the walls like madmen, without carrying a single ladder. (48)

In stressing the religious zealotry of the Crusaders, Maalouf credits the Crusades with a strong ideological component. In emphasizing the role of religious ideology in motivating the Crusaders and fueling their lack of mercy towards Muslims, Jews, and non-Catholic Christians in the Middle East, Maalouf argues for an understanding of the Crusades that considers more than just the factors of land grabs or the expansion of political control.

Maalouf also introduces readers to one of the book’s other major themes: The Context of Inter-Muslim Political Turmoil. This internal division among the fragmented Muslim territories of the east contributed to their inability to stop the Crusaders or, at least, greatly impede their progress. First, leaders did not take the Frankish threat seriously. Second, regional rulers manipulated the situation to retaliate against fellow Muslim enemies rather than launch a jihād that united the Islamic world against the invading Franks.

These two problems directly contributed to the Crusaders’ successes, according to Maalouf, who established rudimentary bureaucratic structures that initially stabilized the kingdoms, counties, and principalities they founded. In contrast, Muslim bureaucracies were ridden with in-fighting and corruption that made a counter-war of secondary or even tertiary concern, as illustrated by the impotent response from the Abbasids in Baghdad, who ruled practically in name only. In this way, Maalouf presents the Crusaders’ victories as enabled, at least in part, by internal problems within the Muslim world itself.

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