The Clash of Civilizations

“People have levels of identity: a resident of Rome may define himself with varying degrees of intensity as a Roman, an Italian, a Catholic, a Christian, a European, a Westerner. The civilization to which he belongs is the broadest level of identification with which he intensely identifies. People can and do redefine their identities and, as a result, the composition and boundaries of civilizations change.”

The broad range of terms by which a person can define themselves makes analyzing global conflicts, on the micro or macro level, inherently complicated. Huntington acknowledges this, clarifying that the “broadest level of identification”—in this example, a Westerner—is the basis for what he argues will be the crux of future conflicts. However, while establishing the influence of civilizational identity is key to all of Huntington’s later claims, he simultaneously acknowledges that forms of identification shift enough to make any assertions fluid and impermanent.

“North African immigration to France generates hostility among Frenchmen and at the same time increased receptivity to immigration by ‘good’ European Catholic Poles. Americans react far more negatively to Japanese investment than to larger investments from Canada and European countries.”

Huntington explores how bias toward one’s own civilization manifests in phenomena like immigration or foreign investments. As he has asserted “Western” and “non-Western” as being the key civilizations in conflict, he notes how even broad or tenuous similarities among Western cultures facilitate an attitude of tolerance or acceptance. There is no inherent reason for Americans to dislike Japanese investments more than Canadian ones or for French people to be more hostile to North Africans than to Orthodox Catholic Polish people; still, he argues, existing notions of who does and doesn’t belong guide people’s reception of “outsiders.”

“[T]he growth of civilization consciousness is enhanced by the dual role of the West. On the one hand, the West is at a peak of power. At the same time, however, and perhaps as a result, a return to the roots phenomenon is occurring among non-Western civilizations. […] A West at the peak of its power confronts non-Wests that increasingly have the desire, the will and the resources to shape the world in non-Western ways.”

Huntington lists Japan, India, the Middle East, and Russia as examples of non-Western civilizations recovering deep-rooted cultural connections in response to The Dominance of the West. He argues that this creates dissonance in these societies: A non-Western culture subject to globalization feels the encroachment of Western fashions, habits, and social developments but remains heavily imbued with its distinct cultural history and ideologies. Furthermore, this creates a cycle of opposition wherein the West seeks to eliminate the “threat” of a non-Western civilization, which merely encourages a return to indigenous roots, thus strengthening those differences.

“In class and ideological conflicts, the key question was ‘Which side are you on?’ and people could and did choose sides and change sides. In conflicts between civilizations, the question is ‘What are you?’ […] Even more than ethnicity, religion discriminates sharply and exclusively among people. A person can be half-French and half-Arab and simultaneously even a citizen of two countries. It is more difficult to be half-Catholic and half-Muslim.”

This statement identifies a key element of Huntington’s argument, particularly regarding his predictions for future global conflicts. As civilization consciousness increases, people define themselves and their goals by broader and broader identities, which allow for less change than subsidiary ones. One can stop being a liberal democrat or communist; one cannot stop being from a Western civilization. He also frequently cites religion as a key force in civilizational clashes, most often with Islam as a Rival to the West, and he here hints at why religion might play such a dominant role in civilizational identity: Many religions make totalizing claims about their validity, meaning that one cannot occupy two or more such identities simultaneously. It is worth noting that in this sense, religion is akin to political ideologies, which are often similarly mutually exclusive and which similarly allow for “converts.” Huntington, however, suggests that religious belief has structured basic societal institutions much more profoundly than any political ideology and is therefore harder to detach oneself from.

“After World War II, the West, in turn, began to retreat; the colonial empires disappeared; first Arab nationalism and then Islamic fundamentalism manifested themselves; the West became heavily dependent on the Persian Gulf countries for its energy; the oil-rich Muslim countries became money-rich and, when they wished to, weapons-rich. Several wars occurred between Arabs and Israel (created by the West).”

Building on the idea of Islam as a rival to the West, Huntington swiftly identifies the political factors that led to the state of affairs when the essay was written, which would continue to cause conflict for decades to come. Huntington acknowledges that the West has played a role in shaping contemporary Islamic societies—this is key to his arguments about a return to indigenous culture and “kin-country syndrome.” Specifically, Huntington argues that Western involvement in Muslim countries not only caused a push for Arab leadership but also encouraged unity of Arab countries against the West as a whole, as evidenced by Saddam Hussein’s plea for support from followers of Islam.

“Muslims contrasted Western actions against Iraq with the West's failure to protect Bosnians against Serbs and to impose sanctions on Israel for violating U.N. resolutions. The West, they alleged, was using a double standard. A world of clashing civilizations, however, is inevitably a world of double standards: people apply one standard to their kin-countries and a different standard to others.”

Huntington both calls out the bias of Western countries’ global politics and normalizes it. For example, in the conflict between Israel and Palestine, the US and the West at large have provided long-term support to the former. He later argues that the UN acts primarily on behalf of the West, so this supposedly global entity favored Israel over Palestine and other Arab countries because of Israel’s greater alignment toward the West. However, Huntington also states that such biases are “inevitable,” implying that they do not admit of any solution. This raises the question of what role his essay is intended to play in geopolitics—i.e., whether he is simply commenting on existing geopolitical divisions and power differentials or in some sense justifying them.

“Common membership in a civilization reduces the probability of violence in situations where it might otherwise occur. In 1991 and 1992 many people were alarmed by the possibility of violent conflict between Russia and Ukraine over territory, particularly Crimea, the Black Sea fleet, nuclear weapons and economic issues. If civilization is what counts, however, the likelihood of violence between Ukrainians and Russians should be low.”

This statement shows that Huntington’s argument is not entirely bulletproof; while states within a civilization may be more likely to get along, his hypothesis overlooks the importance of “minor” differences and political aspirations in instigating conflict. In this particular case, the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022 contradicts Huntington’s assertions.

“Decisions made at the U.N. Security Council or in the International Monetary Fund that reflect the interests of the West are presented to the world as reflecting the desires of the world community. The very phrase ‘the world community’ has become the euphemistic collective noun (replacing ‘the Free World’) to give global legitimacy to actions reflecting the interests of the United States and other Western powers.”

Huntington is explicit about his perception of the UN Security Council as a biased entity that generally gives preferential treatment to the United States, Britain, France, Germany, and Japan (the only geographically non-Western country that he routinely positions as an economic ally to the West). Existing cultural borders have created a “global” council that, in reality, contributes to Western dominance and furthers Western military interests, particularly in enforcing the nonproliferation of major weaponry in Arab countries. In doing so, it casts the West’s aims as universally beneficial instead of self-serving.

“Modern democratic government originated in the West. When it has developed in non-Western societies it has usually been the product of Western colonialism or imposition. […] The central axis of world politics in the future is likely to be […] the conflict between ‘the West and the Rest’ and the responses of non-Western civilizations to Western power and values. Those responses generally take one or a combination of three forms. […] The third alternative is to attempt to ‘balance’ the West by developing economic and military power and cooperating with other non-Western societies against the West, while preserving indigenous values and institutions; in short, to modernize but not to Westernize.”

Huntington outlines three ways that non-Western countries may respond to the extreme proliferation of Western values throughout the world. Isolation, as in North Korea, is the first option, and openly allying with the West is the second. A third option is to oppose the West, but Huntington asserts numerous times how difficult this is in the face of globalization and increasing civilization consciousness. The West has imposed its dominance, often by force, so maintaining an indigenous culture and political system is difficult. The UN’s orientation toward Western interests only exacerbates the challenge.

“[I]n Mexico as in Turkey, significant elements in society resist the redefinition of their country's identity. In Turkey, European-oriented leaders have to make gestures to Islam (Ozal’s pilgrimage to Mecca); so also Mexico’s North American-oriented leaders have to make gestures to those who hold Mexico to be a Latin American country (Salinas’ Ibero-American Guadalajara summit).”

Huntington draws this comparison in his argument about “torn countries”—nations torn between two civilizational identities. Turkey did find some political alliances with the West, but he notes a major revival of Islamic cultural values and argues that it ultimately has oriented itself as a Middle Eastern Muslim society. Turkish officials point to religion as the primary factor in barring Turkey from the West. Meanwhile, he identifies Mexico as trying to assimilate to the West culturally and politically. These opposing examples show not only how torn countries may gravitate either toward the Western or non-Western side but also how global the phenomenon is.

“The conflict between liberal democracy and Marxism-Leninism was between ideologies which, despite their major differences, ostensibly shared ultimate goals of freedom, equality and prosperity. A traditional, authoritarian, nationalist Russia could have quite different goals. A Western democrat could carry on an intellectual debate with a Soviet Marxist. It would be virtually impossible for him to do that with a Russian traditionalist.”

As Russia has redefined itself in its move toward a non-Western civilizational identity, Huntington argues, it has lost common ground with Western countries, breeding further polarization. With the loss of its power following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Russia was forced to find another means of establishing itself on a global stage, and it has done so by adopting values that Huntington claims are irreconcilable with Western ones. This aligns with his earlier assertions on how non-Western nations return to their roots to combat the dominance of the West.

“The West promotes nonproliferation as a universal norm and nonproliferation treaties and inspections as means of realizing that norm. It also threatens a variety of sanctions against those who promote the spread of sophisticated weapons and proposes some benefits for those who do not. The attention of the West focuses, naturally, on nations that are actually or potentially hostile to the West.”

Huntington again emphasizes how the West uses global resources and alliances to suppress the development of non-Western strength and independence. While many efforts for nonproliferation have operated under the guise of goodwill and peace, the call has often solely targeted those countries seen as opposing Western values, even if they were not actively threatening any Western countries. Meanwhile, the US has a massive military that exercises power and control over countries worldwide. Sanctions are a form of economic control that further coerces non-Western countries into limiting their means of defending themselves from or threatening the West. Huntington’s tone here is that of a neutral observer merely commenting on how Western actions have exacerbated tensions.

“A new form of arms competition is thus occurring between Islamic-Confucian states and the West. In an old-fashioned arms race, each side developed its own arms to balance or to achieve superiority against the other side. In this new form of arms competition, one side is developing its arms and the other side is attempting not to balance but to limit and prevent that arms build-up while at the same time reducing its own military capabilities.”

Building on the previous quote, Huntington outlines how the arms race—which traditionally consisted of trying to have a larger military—has fundamentally changed since civilizations have supplanted nations or cultures as the main geopolitical players. This statement acknowledges the difficulties of the West’s situation, as efforts to limit nuclear arms haven’t been mirrored by non-Western countries. It is difficult to strike a balance between encouraging nonproliferation and maintaining military dominance, which is likely why the West finds alternative forms of control through political and economic means.