Salt Sugar Fat

Dean Southworth worked on Cheez Whiz for Kraft. He continues to eat it in his retirement. Devised in the 1950s as an easy spread for Welsh rarebit, Cheez Whiz became an early processed-food hit.

The product contained large amounts of saturated fat and salt. Kraft later removed most of the cheese from the recipe, to reduce production and storage costs. Further products, such as Velveeta and American Singles, have resulted in new categories, such as “pasteurized cheese product.” Combined with traditional cheese, these form a staple of the American diet, growing rapidly in consumption:

Cheese has become the single largest source saturated fat in the American diet, though it is hardly the only culprit. Day in and day out, Americans on average are exceeding the recommended maximum of fat by more than 50 percent (181).

Moss blames high cheese consumption on food industry engineering and marketing: “It is no longer a rare treat to be savored with guests, before a meal. In the hands of food manufacturers, cheese has become an ingredient” (181).

In 1912, James Lewis Kraft struggled to sell cheddar cheese, due to spoilage. He experimented for three years, until finding that stirring melted cheese enabled it to form a preservable product: Kraft Cheese. Competitors fought to prevent this from being labeled as cheese. In the end, it came to be called “processed cheese.”

The durable cheese sold well to the military, and to grocers. By 1923, Kraft had become the largest cheese maker on the planet.

In Velveeta, stirring is replaced by chemical emulsification. In the ensuing decades, Kraft invented individually-wrapped cheese slices. Kraft also developed manufacturing techniques to reduce the time to make cheese from years to days.

Moss accuses the dairy industry, Kraft, and the federal government of conspiring to convince people to eat more cheese. Milk had a reputation as unhealthily fatty. Technological and business shifts meant that more cows produced yet more unwanted milkfat. The federal government treats dairy as essential and subsidizes the industry, purchasing unwanted products, so dairy companies converted excess milk and milkfat into cheese, selling it to the government:

This cheese, along with surplus butter and dried milk, accumulated into a stack that weighed 1.9 billion pounds, and it cost taxpayers $4 billion a year. With more truckloads arriving daily, this milkfat mountain was growing faster than the national debt. The storage fees alone were running upwards of $1 million a day. It grew so large, in fact, that the government began secreting it away in caverns and a vast, abandoned limestone mine near Kansas City (187).

A Reagan-era congressman displayed moldy cheese to promote cutbacks. This angered dairy companies, whose cheese should have lasted. Congress then turned to marketing dairy products instead.

Moss meets Ulfert Broockmann, a former dairy technician who devours enormous amounts of cheese, goes on long bike rides, and is in great health.

Broockmann does not buy cheese from Kraft, where he formerly worked and whom he sued. The lawsuit and his refusal to eat their cheese both stem from Kraft’s use of enzymes to speed up the production process, affecting flavor.

In its efforts to get people to eat more cheese, Kraft failed with pre-sliced cream cheese. They then succeeded with flavored cheese spreads. Kraft also expanded their famous line of macaroni and cheese: “In their strategy memos on this move, the cheese managers referred to the Blue Box ‘leveraging its cheesiest point of difference’” (192). Kraft then extended this strategy to Velveeta Cheesy Skillets, and advertised heavily:

In the television ad campaign for these meal supplements, a strapping and handsome blacksmith dips a ladle into a pot of melted yellow cheese and brings the thick velvety goo up slowly while singing, in baritone, ‘Liquid Go-o-o-o-o-o-o-ld’ (192).

Competitors added more cheese to their own products. Despite popular concerns about fat consumption, cheesy products sold more rapidly, while milk products dropped: “Where Americans, on average, were eating 11 pounds of cheese a year in 1970, they were up to 18 pounds in 1980, 25 pounds by 1990, 30 pounds in 2000, and 33 pounds by 2007” (194).

Kraft advertised cream cheese as a recipe ingredient, hiring Paula Deen, a Food Network personality, to promote it. Sales soared. Deen was diagnosed with diabetes, which some blamed on her fatty cooking. She argued for moderation.

Dutch scientists tested people by providing versions of foods that did or did not reveal how much fat they contained. Subjects underestimated how much fat the food contained when it wasn’t visibly greasy, and ate more of it.

Oscar Mayer sells bologna, heavy in saturated fat and salt. To make the product more exciting, they combined it into a kit called Lunchables.

The vast majority of new product launches fail. Only a tiny proportion earn most of the money. Lunchables proved an enormous hit. However, they initially sold at a loss.

Oscar Mayer merged with Kraft, which merged with Philip Morris. The tobacco giant provided the funding to turn Lunchables into a profitable billion dollar business. However, the product came as consumers worried about the health effects of fat.

Oscar Mayer started as a company by standing behind their quality, and having voluntary government meat inspections. By the 1980s, red meat itself had become a health concern, not just safe handling: “Fat was becoming synonymous with cholesterol, clogged arteries, heart attacks, and strokes. And as a result, between 1980 and 1990, red meat consumption fell more than 10 percent” (205).

Oscar Mayer began blending poultry into its beef products. They expanded advertising. They also extensively reformulated recipes for cost savings.

Bob Drane was tasked with modernizing the Oscar Mayer lunch. He discovered through market research that mothers cared about the time to prepare lunch, more so than the ingredients. Drane established a small development team to experiment with convenient lunches:

Having set themselves up in Oscar Mayer’s headquarters building, they got started by studying other vulnerable designs in consumer goods that underwent successful transformations, such as the boom box (which morphed into the Walkman), kids’ shoelaces (which became Velcro), and exploratory surgery (which gave way to the MRI) (208).

The team decided on a conveniently-packaged lunch. They included deli meat, crackers to replace bread, and Kraft processed cheese. They assembled twenty designs, settling on the familiar version, which took inspiration from a TV dinner. Extensive market testing revealed positive reviews. It sold well in the western states, then more widely.

After acquiring Kraft and General Foods, Philip Morris held a meeting to discuss the food industry. With machines replacing people to assemble Lunchables, the product finally reached profitability.

While the rest of Oscar Mayer was failing, Lunchables led its category. Product variations added more salt, sugar, and fat. Competition from other companies would force these ingredients to satisfy customers. Additionally, ingredients like carrots would not withstand the storage requirements.

Moss discusses Lunchables with Kraft in 2011. The company now aims to reduce the salt, sugar, and fat gradually, without displeasing consumers, while adding fruit. Some consumers continue to complain about unhealthy ingredients. The company responds that ultimately children choose what they eat.

In the 1990s, pizza became especially popular. Kraft tried to make pizza Lunchables. Mothers disliked it, but kids liked it. Kraft packaged the product like a gift, and won over mothers. Kraft advertised the sense of control and fun for children. Kraft followed with Mexican-themed, hamburger, and hot dog Lunchables, and even breakfast products.

In the 2000s, diabetes became a public health concern. An advocacy group measured the salt, sugar, and fat in Lunchables-style foods. They found extremely high amounts. Kraft responded by reducing the amount of these ingredients.

Drane had a daughter who proudly ate Lunchables. Later, as an adult, she realizes the health and environmental harms of the product. She does not feed her own children Lunchables. One of Drane’s sons does eat Lunchables and feeds them to his children.

Drane says that product developers often develop processed foods for lower-class people. He defends his work, although wishes the product were more nutritious. Now he pushes for a non-profit that opposes obesity, blaming processed food.

The immense Department of Agriculture (USDOA) regulates food in America. Moss accuses the organization of a conflict of interest. The Department of Agriculture represents the American citizens, yet is also subject to food-industry lobbyists.

More than snacks, both cheese and red meat carry the saturated fats that may cause health problems. Moss claims that the Department of Agriculture does as much as industry to promote eating these foods.

A small branch of the USDOA does promote nutrition. It produces a guide to healthy eating. This implicates salt, sugar, and fat as unhealthy. In 2010, an update implicated saturated fat as contributing to diabetes.

Young people especially consume large amounts of saturated fat. Americans consume these fats from cheese, pizza, red meat, cakes, and cookies, among other sources.

Moss writes that the USDOA does not warn Americans against red meat and cheese, as it should. The USDOA argues that they act transparently and fairly.

A 2010 USDOA document advocates eating more cheese. It suggests eating non- and low-fat cheese and meat. Moss says that these products are rare in grocery stores, and not representative of what people consider buying.

The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) regulates food other than meat and dairy. It requires product packages to label contents, showing the amount of salt, sugar, and fat, unlike the Department of Agriculture.

Moss accuses the USDOA of assisting the meat industry in tricking shoppers into buying fattier cuts: “[…] records show that seven of the [USDOA] panel’s thirteen members were nominated by the Grocery Manufacturer’s Association” (445).

The Grocery Manufacturer’s Association includes the large food companies, such as Kraft, Kellogg, and Nestle. They lobby to allow salt, sugar, and fat, in high amounts, in food.

Some consumers argue that processed foods lack nutrition. The Grocery Manufacturer’s Association responds that these foods are nutritious, convenient, and economically valuable.

When the Reagan-era Department of Agriculture had dairy cows slaughtered to reduce excess milk production, beef flooded the market. Farmers then bought new dairy cows to produce more milk, which was profitable due to government incentives, so that cheese volumes remained high.

In the 1985 Farm Bill, the Department of Agriculture purchased 200 million pounds of beef to distribute to the poor. It also enabled beef and dairy marketing, levying ranchers for an advertising fund.

People had been eating less beef and substituting chicken and fish, which contain less saturated fat. Like cheese, industry aimed to transform beef from a standalone into an ingredient. The result: precooked beef meals such as Hormel Pot Roast.

Beef producers also developed convenient snacks, some including cheese. With advertising, beef popularity grew in the 1980s. The industry says that beef can be lean, and contains healthy fatty acids, zinc, and vitamin B12.

Lean cuts of beef have less consumer appeal. Producers tenderize these cuts mechanically or chemically. One economical hamburger product received the nickname “pink slime.” Producers add ammonia to kill pathogens from fecal contact with organ meat, providing the pink hue.

The government used “pink slime” for school lunch programs and in prison meals. The product also sold to groceries and restaurants. The USDA deliberated as to whether the ammonia was part of the processing or part of the product.

Moss claims to have made “pink slime” into a public issue by writing about it in 2009. A beef producer, the USDA, and some parents aimed to reduce use of the product. McDonald’s stopped using the product in 2011.

A 2007 scientific effort to identify the probable causes of cancer studied thousands of articles. The researchers found insufficient evidence for sugary foods. They had previously found insufficient evidence for meat. They identified more recent research as finding a colon cancer culprit in meats, especially processed ones, unrelated to saturated fat.

The beef industry advertised against this risk. A consulting firm found flaws in the research. Balanced media coverage defused the threat of public backlash.

In 2005, the US Supreme Court ruled that the government beef advertising program should promote all beef equally, not highlighting any particular producers such as those selling fancier products. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg wrote an opinion noting the contradiction between the government promoting beef and also calling it a public health concern.

The government dairy marketing program has partnered with companies such as Domino’s to promote cheese, despite health concerns. Kraft, meanwhile, has become concerned about the health effects of its products.

Ellen Wartella raised children on home cooking and some processed foods. The kids preferred processed foods. Later, as adolescents, they rebelled against the possible health consequences of processed foods and tobacco.

Wartella, a communications academic, was invited by Kraft to join a panel on obesity. Her offspring were annoyed because Kraft was owned by Philip Morris, the large tobacco company.

Wartella has researched how children differentiate between editorial and advertising content, a line which marketers worked to blur. Moss blames obesity on this advertising.

Wartella joined the group, although she became concerned when the discussion revolved beyond Kraft’s own involvement in obesity. She accused Kraft of deviously marketing to children.

Kraft surprised the panel by taking active interest in her criticism. With Wal-Mart having just started to sell food, market pressure was intense, making Kraft’s health concern more remarkable:

Starting in the late 1990s, a small group of senior Kraft officials had been watching America’s massive weight gain with growing alarm. They didn’t buy the industry’s view that consumers were to blame for the obesity crisis by being slothful or lacking in willpower (258).

Some company insiders took moral stances, while others argued for the long-term profitability of the company. These skeptical executives ran the panel.

Kraft had historically depended on salt, sugar, and fat to target the bliss point of consumers. Now, some employees wanted to add health as a concern.

The Kraft insiders aimed to avoid promoting overindulgence while still promoting their foods.

Moss writes that Philip Morris had supplied incentives and techniques to Kraft to market abusively. However:

the same tobacco-steeped overlords in New York who had spent their own careers promoting cigarettes and denying addiction did the unthinkable: They fell in with the cabal and began urging Kraft to make changes in response to the growing epidemic of obesity (259).

A 1925 ad campaign promoted cigarettes as a healthy alternative to overeating. By 1953, the industry ceased marketing tobacco as healthy.

Researchers found that high fat consumption may be linked to lung cancer. However, Philip Morris acquired Kraft and lost interest in this research. Saturated fat posed a health and marketing issue. Kraft also added sugar and other health issues to Philip Morris.

Chief executive Hamish Maxwell told company managers that they were lowering fat and sugar, along with making lighter cigarettes. Companies respond to consumer demand for healthy products with line extensions that sacrifice flavor.

Philip Morris excelled at appealing to consumers, introducing hits like the Taco Bell dinner kit. In 1980, obesity rates began to grow rapidly, becoming a public health concern. More people blamed unbalanced diets than lack of exercise. The response had the potential to severely affect American agriculture.

Philip Morris suddenly faced a massive legal attack on tobacco from dozens of states: “In 1998, the states won. Philip Morris joined the other big tobacco manufacturers in settling the litigation by agreeing to pay the states a stunning $365 billion to revive their moribund health care systems” (264).

The tobacco companies also lost reputation, and worked to regain consumer confidence. They noted that media companies sell alarming stories about fat, salt, sugar, and biotechnology.

Moss writes that Philip Morris had separated itself from other tobacco companies by taking some responsibility for the health problems from smoking. Then-CEO Geoffrey Bible thought that food companies would also isolate the company if dietary problems became a public issue. He wanted to balance profit and moral concerns. Bible argued for Kraft to address a middle ground between junk food and health food.

John Ruff, a Kraft executive, looked skeptically at Bible and Philip Morris. Ruff then became convinced that the company should respond to consumer concern. Bible predicts that obesity will become the big company problem.

Ruff battled obesity himself. After failing to lose weight through exercise, he switched to a diet that required avoiding his own company’s products. He lost weight. Kraft assigned him to its anti-obesity program.

Michael Mudd, a senior vice president who had previously failed to convince other companies to fight against obesity, organized the panel with Ellen Wartella. The group gained support from Kraft. The company altered its policy on advertising to children, and modified nutrition labels.

Through growing appetites, people began to consume more than one serving size. Food companies continued to label contents per serving anyways. Kraft, however, made it easier to see the contents of an entire package.

After Kraft presented the new labels, the rest of the food industry followed suit. Now food packages even show the entire calorie contents on the front, as Kraft initially wanted.

Processed foods still contain large amounts of salt, sugar, and fat. In response, Kraft introduced limits to these ingredients in its products.

Moss visits Kraft, which does not divulge details of these limits. Competitors doubt Kraft’s sincerity. Kraft says that it removes millions of pounds of salt and billions of calories, while adding billions of servings of whole grains. Moss calls it a small amount.

Investors asked Kraft for better sales, which challenged efforts to make foods healthier. Kraft stocks fell, while competitors’ stocks rose. Philip Morris was divesting from Kraft, which they slowed down due to the price drop. In 2007, Kraft became an independent company again.

In the 2010s, Kraft introduced fatty and sugary products to India. From malnutrition, the country had begun to worry about obesity.

In the early 2000s, American consumers had reduced their consumption of cookies due to health fears. Trans fats in particular had become a public concern, and the Atkins diet advocated against carbohydrates.

Kraft developed a 100-calorie cookie, which sold well and had consumers buying fattier cookies, too. Hershey’s and other companies introduced competitive products.

Kraft tried to produce a tastier cookie, but it required exceeding the ingredient caps. So they added a new category with higher caps.

In 2010, Kraft bought Cadbury for $19.6 billion. The combined company expanded in markets like India. It also expanded in the US, where it introduced a product combining cream cheese with milk chocolate: “Because fat is so energy dense—it has twice the calories of sugar—the brain sees fat in food as the body’s best friend” (280).Combined with sugar, fat signals the body to eat more food.