Justice

Sandel opens with stories of price gouging in the wake of a 2004 hurricane. Florida residents were outraged that anyone would “try to capitalize on other people’s hardship and misery,” but economists pointed out that prices are determined by supply and demand in a market society (2-3). Higher prices “simply reflect the value that buyers and sellers choose to place on the things they exchange,” according to free-market economists like Thomas Sowell. Others argued that an emergency is not a “normal free market situation” (5). Rather, in emergencies, “buyers under duress have no freedom” (5).

Sandel characterizes this debate as one that “raises hard questions of morality and law” (5). To answer these questions, we must consider what “justice” means (5).

Sandel presents three approaches to justice: theories based on (1) “maximizing welfare,” (2) “respecting freedom,” and (3) “promoting virtue” (5-6, 18). This book discusses the strengths and weaknesses of each of these theories. Maximizing welfare is explored by examining utilitarianism. Respecting freedom includes two competing strands: a laissez-faire strand, and a fairness strand of egalitarians. Virtue theories are represented by cultural conservatives, among others.

In the price-gouging debate, both sides rely on theories based on welfare and freedom. The free-market side argues that price-gouging maximizes welfare by providing incentives to produce goods that are in demand. Their opponents argue that price-gouging decreases overall welfare and that buyers are not free in times of hardship. These opponents also rely on a virtue argument by characterizing the price-gougers as greedy. This is an argument not about welfare or freedom but about “cultivating the attitudes and dispositions, the qualities of character, on which a good society depends” (7).

Some argue that the law should be “neutral toward competing conceptions of virtue,” instead of promoting a particular view of it (8). This is a major question of political philosophy that divides ancient philosophers like Aristotle, who believes the law cannot be neutral on the question of virtue, and modern philosophers like Immanuel Kant and John Rawls, who argue that individuals should be free to choose their own idea of virtue. The strengths and weaknesses of these views are explored later in the book. Sandel cautions, however, that the divide between the two is not so clear-cut, because the “conviction that justice involves virtue as well as choice runs deep” (9).

Exploring the idea that justice involves virtue, Sandel discusses a recent debate over the standards for awarding the Purple Heart to soldiers wounded in battle. Veterans’ advocates argue that those with post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) should qualify. The Pentagon’s position, however, is that only physical injuries qualify. Despite the superficial arguments for or against, Sandel points out that the real issue is “the meaning of the medal and the virtues it honors” (11). This dispute thus illustrates Aristotle’s position that we must assess competing views of virtue to decide these matters.

Before turning to each of the three theories of justice in detail, Sandel discusses what moral reasoning is, using a hypothetical often used in philosophy courses. The idea is that you are driving a runaway trolley car, and you will hit five people if you continue on your current track, but you could choose to switch tracks and would only kill one person. Many people would say you should switch tracks, but what if you had to push someone into the path of the trolley to save the five people? What if you could release a trap door that would accomplish the same thing? Thinking through why we see these cases differently is “a way of sorting out our own moral convictions, of figuring out what we believe and why” (23). Hypotheticals like the trolley problem help us “isolate the moral principles at issue and examine their force” (23).

Actual moral dilemmas often involve uncertainty that is removed from hypotheticals. For example, in 2005, a special forces team commander decided not to kill unarmed goatherds who came upon their operation, even though that would have been the clear tactical decision, because his “Christian soul” would not let him do so. All three of his men and another sixteen soldiers were killed after the goatherds informed the Taliban of the soldiers’ position. In retrospect, the commander regretted his decision, possibly because he no longer saw the goatherds as innocent bystanders. If he had known that they opposed the Taliban but would be tortured to reveal their location, that would have raised an even tougher moral dilemma.

Ultimately, “life in democratic societies is rife with disagreement about right and wrong, justice and injustice” (26). Issues like abortion, taxation, affirmative action, and torture of terror suspects divide us. But moral persuasion can also change our minds. This book seeks to explain how we can “reason our way through the contested terrain of justice and injustice, equality and inequality, individual rights and the common good” (27). We start with a moral dilemma and a conviction about the right thing to do, then reflect on the basis for that conviction, and then turn to philosophy in our confusion over competing principles. We continue to move between our judgments and our principles when we encounter new dilemmas, and public engagement is required to resolve them.