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Steven PinkerA modern alternative to SparkNotes and CliffsNotes, SuperSummary offers high-quality Study Guides with detailed chapter summaries and analysis of major themes, characters, and more.
Chapter 5 focuses on human reasoning and starts by introducing Darwin and Wallace. These two scientists independently arrived at natural selection as how species evolve, but where Darwin saw no problems with the human brain (and mind) evolving through natural selection, Wallace found the issue to be a sticking point. He argued that foragers and those in non-industrial civilizations would not need a very large or complex brain. Therefore, once we were foragers, human intelligence should have stagnated and not reached the level it has reached in modern humans.
Like many arguments against the human brain evolving, Wallace’s contention doesn’t consider the basic tenet of natural selection: It does not have a goal. Scientific thinking is slow and methodical, which could be a problem when needing to make quick decisions. Heuristics and knowledge of the current situation are more highly valued in some environments, and that doesn’t mean that the brain required to handle that thinking is any less complex or advanced than a brain molded for scientific thinking. Each person’s brain is shaped by the environment of the brains that came before it and its own environment to maximize skills needed for survival in that environment.
One common thread in human thinking is categorizing. Theories of why we categorize information tend to fall short of a true reason because they don’t address a survival need. Just because categories could reduce the load of storing information doesn’t mean we need to make them and that there would be a survival pressure to do so. Instead, categories are useful because they let us quickly assign properties to new information without needing to learn all the properties all over again. Every time we meet a dog, we do not need to learn that it barks, is furry, has four legs, and likes chasing toys. Once we know it is a dog, we know it likely has those traits.
What is interesting about categories, as mentioned in Chapter 2, is that we can apply fuzzy logic to them. We can have creatures that span multiple categories or multiple creatures in one category that don’t seem related (for example, ostrich, penguin, and bluebird are all birds). Categories are formed because they are useful and typically follow biological, physical, or legal laws, but their utility also necessitates keeping them appropriately general to avoid ending up with as many categories as items. The categories we form are not strict criteria or somehow determinative. They are useful, but they have limits. Stereotypes that give rise to racism or sexism are good examples. Many stereotypes are based on statistical trends in differences between groups, but these trends do not mean that individuals should be judged using those statistics or that those statistics give us any idea of the reasons why those differences exist (such as discrimination, biology, traditional cultural roles, or history).
We learn these categories and laws at a young age. Elizabeth Spelke and Renee Baillargeon have shown that even three-month-old infants have expectations based on natural laws of physics. They expect two objects moving together to be connected in some way, and they expect solid objects to remain solid such that other objects can’t move through them. These early indications of our understanding of basic physical laws support the idea that we form categories early based on those observable laws, but infants do not fully understand the laws they are using to reason about the world. Even adults don’t often fully understand physics; instead, we describe what we tend to observe, which sometimes means we are not exact or even mischaracterize what might happen.
As infants, we also appear to understand the difference between animate and inert objects. We treat inert objects differently, and we do not ascribe any innate “essence” to them. If we dress up a lion or even paint it with stripes and shave its mane, small children still call it a lion. Its “lion-ness” is not in how it looks. If we change a coffeepot into a bird feeder, children and adults will say it is now a bird feeder. Its function is its essence, and as its function changes, so does its essence.
As we reason about animate and inert objects, we reason about other people’s minds. We don’t use strict scientific principles or black and white algorithms to determine why people behave a certain way or how they may choose to behave. Instead, we use observations from experience and develop models of likely behaviors and reasons to explain other people’s minds. These explanations are not perfectly accurate, but they are typically correct and help us connect with others. At an early age, we use other people’s gaze direction to help us understand what they are thinking. Infants look at their parents’ eyes when confused, and they look where their parents are looking to figure out what is interesting in the environment. Joint attention (sharing attention on the same object or event) is an ability we develop early and helps us connect with people over shared interests.
People are not typically good at using logic to solve problems unless the problem is a cost-benefit question in which someone who receives the benefit without paying the cost is a “cheater.” Finding cheaters seems to be hardwired into human reasoning, but applying that logic to other problems is not. Mathematics is a good example of a system of logic that humans appear disposed to use in ways related to basic survival, but they do not readily apply them beyond those basic functions without training. Increasing mathematical skills, or any logical skills, involves practice. Like the brain itself, these systems are built from very small pieces (understanding basic numeracy and “smaller” and “greater” than) to larger units (counting to 100 and beyond, adding) to even more complex systems (number sets, algebra, calculus).
When students learning math have to start from the small pieces to solve complex problems, the process is challenging and consumes considerable resources. When they can build the intermediate units and use those automatically, they can start from only one or two levels lower than the problem in front of them. They can reduce the load, but they had to spend time and resources building those units. Without regular practice and a reason to build those units, they will use the small pieces for each problem presented. People are not unintelligent, but we are working with a brain adapted for living a foraging and/or hunting lifestyle. Small, discrete numbers, highly spatial problems, and basic survival questions are ingrained in us, but abstract algebra is not.
Chapter 5 is the first chapter in which human ego and bias enter into our understanding of how the mind works. They exist in some of the arguments against the computational theory of mind, but natural selection brings them out starkly. Wallace is convinced that humans in foraging societies require less complex brains than humans in industrialized societies. He contends that our brains could not have evolved from the same brain as theirs did because of the differences in our environments. In one sense, Wallace is correct in assuming that foraging and industrialized communities face different pressures. Those pressures will place greater weight on different skills. However, two sets of human brains would need to face different pressures for a long time to look radically different. As Pinker reminds us, change happens on a slow timeline because small tweaks that improve survival must first catch on and spread across the population, and then changes must continue until the final brains are drastically different. This situation does not describe foraging and industrial societies in Wallace’s time.
Another issue with Wallace’s contention is that he thinks that humans would develop an evolutionary pressure to become good at math and philosophy and science. However, these systems of thinking do not improve survival, even in an industrialized nation. They offer some benefits, but they do not change the likelihood of dying or mating. Natural selection does not have a goal, and genes related to math ability won’t be selected unless they become connected to getting mates or surviving. Additionally, as Pinker discusses, these skills are learned through practice. There isn’t any evidence that foraging humans can’t learn math if started at a young age like children in industrial societies. These skills are difficult for most humans because they require using our minds for something other than their evolved purpose. We must maintain those skills or they will slip away in favor of whatever skills we are using. Math and science are not the pinnacle of human thought but simply pursuits to which some humans have chosen to devote resources.
The discussion regarding Wallace leads to an examination of how we develop these non-essential logical skills at all. Due to the brain’s ability to build simple units into complex units, to embed functions within other functions, and to adapt older structures for newer needs, we can develop highly abstract concepts and societies that appear far removed from the hunting and foraging societies of our ancestors. Our history shows itself in things like language, in which we still use spatial words and words describing force to convey abstract concepts. Therefore, to deal with Wallace’s contention that the modern human mind could not have risen from ancestral humans, we can say that there is evidence it did. Our issues with many abstract concepts, our use of concrete, spatial words to describe abstract ideas, and our use of heuristics to solve most problems quickly reveal the modern human mind to be a well-trained ancient human mind. Through practice with abstract ideas and new symbol systems (math), we arrive at our current abilities, not through a complete overhaul and separate brain from our ancestors.
By Steven Pinker