How Civil Wars Start: And How to Stop Them

Nonfiction | Book | Adult | Published in 2022

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Summary

Background

Chapter Summaries & Analyses

Introduction

Chapter 1

Chapter 2

Chapter 3

Chapter 4

Chapter 5

Chapter 6

Chapter 7

Chapter 8

Key Figures

Themes

Index of Terms

Important Quotes

Essay Topics

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Themes

Patterns and Risk Factors for Civil Wars

Prior to the 21st century, civil wars took place on large battlefields and involved armies and conventional fighting tactics. In addition, ideology or class often caused civil wars. The civil wars of our current age are drastically different. For this reason, one of the main themes in this book is the patterns and risk factors that predict where and when civil wars might break out.

Walter notes how there are two factors that “predict better than anything else where civil wars [are] likely to break out” (36). The first is anocracy, the zone in which a country is moving toward or away from democratic principles. Countries that are most at risk for civil war fall within anocracies—a form of government that shares both democratic and autocratic principles. As one example, under Saddam Hussein, Iraqis did not face civil war. Civil war erupted as soon as his government was dismantled, and political power was fought over by different religious and regional militias. While many Iraqis hoped for a democratic government, the already deep factionalism prevented them from being able to rapidly transition to a democracy. The path from autocracy to democracy led them to a civil war.

The second variable is factionalism. Walter emphasizes that factionalism itself appears in predictable ways. There is first an ethnic entrepreneur who drums up initial support among a small group of individuals by emphasizing identity politics. This individual slowly builds support among ordinary citizens through fearmongering rhetoric. In particular, the ethnic entrepreneur tells supporters and those within their identity group that they are under attack from those they consider to be other. This rhetoric creates a climate where people are willing to resort to violence to protect their culture and family. Superfactions, or countries where there are two dominant groups who are typically separated by not only identity but also geography, religion, and class, are particularly prone to political instability and civil war.

Walter proceeds to identify two other patterns and risk factors that could result in civil wars if anocracy and factionalism are both already present. The first is the loss of status by a group previously in power. This status loss is particularly egregious for sons of the soil groups (e.g., the Moro in the Philippines) who believe they have strong cultural ties to a particular area. These strong ties often lead them to dominate the political, cultural, and social landscape, making it seem as if their power is natural. Thus, when they lose power, they feel this loss is unnatural and turn to violence to restore the natural way of things. Walter believes that sons of the soil groups are especially dangerous factions in our modern era.

The second factor is the loss of hope by groups, including through failed protests and failed elections, that they can improve their future. Hope is powerful because it “makes the present more bearable and creates incentives for even the downtrodden to work within a system rather than burn it down” (84). People with hope believe their futures will be better. Once people no longer believe they can anticipate something better in the future, they lose hope. Extremist groups are then able to step in as alternatives to the existing system. Once this happens, violence becomes more likely.

Despite the decades of research documenting these four risk factors, people still continue to miss them. Walter suggests that recognizing and responding to these threats before it is too late is crucial. As such, she remains adamant that governments treat domestic terrorist groups similar to foreign ones. Failure to do so by governments will result in further conflict and civil wars.

Social Media's Corrosive Influence on Democracy

Social media companies, such as Facebook and Twitter, have touted their platforms “as a great tool of democratization” (108). Their founders and employees argue that these platforms put political, economic, and social power in the hands of ordinary people. They enable people to connect and build communities, spread ideas and opinions freely, and curate their own news rather than large media companies. Walter argues, however, that “social media platforms have proven to be a Pandora’s box” (109). Their primary purpose, which is to make sharing information free and open, has helped to corrode democracies around the world. Walter explores three interconnecting ways this has happened.

First, social media platforms have enabled the spread of misinformation and disinformation. Prior to the birth of social media, many ethnic entrepreneurs were shut out from major media companies and political processes. As a result, it was harder for them to spread their propaganda and populist agendas. Social media platforms, in trying to open up information sharing, gave a platform to these individuals, many of whom became leaders of their countries, including Rodrigo Duterte (Philippines), Donald Trump (US), Recep Tayyip Erdoğan (Turkey), and Narendra Modi (India). Walter underscores that “open, unregulated social media platforms” (109) coincide with growing ethnic factions, social divisions, and resentment against immigrants and the elections of populist leaders.

Second, social media platforms now enable voters to elect populist leaders. Prior to social media, coups by elites or the military enabled anti-democratic leaders to come to power. Social media has changed this landscape. To Walter, the reason for this is that social media enables populist leaders to manipulate and amplify ordinary citizens’ fears about democracy through the spread of misinformation and disinformation. People turn to these leaders as an alternative to their current government leaders. Populist leaders can also convince some people that an election has been stolen, in part because people have lost faith in the democratic process. Trump is an especially poignant example. Walter notes that “in the contest between liberal democracies and authoritarian regimes, social media is inadvertently helping the autocrats win” (119).

Third, social media platforms increase factionalism. Walter notes that “this is, of course, because myth, emotion, and the politics of grievances—all of which drive factionalism—make for incredibly engaging content” (119). Social media algorithms further exacerbate division by driving people to only view content that supports their perspectives. As a result, people are drifting farther apart from one another since they quite literally have their own version of reality. People are now starting to see individuals not in their group as “other.” Walter finds the ability of ethnic entrepreneurs to shape people’s views of “the other” especially concerning.

Walter places substantial blame on social media companies for the corrosive effects their platforms have had on liberal democracies around the world. Journalists, governments, nongovernmental organizations, and more sounded alarm bells about how social media was spreading hate speech and propaganda and inciting violence in the early days of social media. The companies ignored these concerns. An especially poignant example is Facebook’s refusal to take down hate speech directed at Rohingya people by Buddhist nationalists in Myanmar, which played a key role in the ethnic cleansing of this group.

While Walter does not discuss specifically how social media should be regulated, she argues it is odd that the government regulates all other industries except for this one. Regardless, Walter firmly believes in the real danger of social media as an accelerant to conflict.

American Democracy and Its Vulnerabilities

Like many other ordinary people who lived through civil wars, Walter struggled to comprehend the January 6 Insurrection, which caused her to ponder how a vibrant, multicultural country like the US could turn to violence. She notes, “This is America…We are known for our tolerance and veneration of democracy” (135). Yet, as a political scientist, Walter saw the warning signs. The US displays all four patterns and risk factors that prelude civil wars.

First, the US polity index score dropped for the first time in over 200 years to the anocracy zone. Trump is at the center of this drop. During his presidency, he attacked the very foundations of democratic principles. The US faced great instability during his reign, including a global pandemic, economic instability, and riots in the streets over systemic injustices and racism sparked by the deaths of Black men and women at the hands of police. Instead of helping to reinstate Americans’ trust in major institutions, Trump intentionally undermined them by spreading lies and amplifying division. Walter finds this drop especially worrisome since “a partial democracy is three times as likely to experience civil war as a full democracy” (140).

Second, factionalism has substantially increased. Several of the Founding Fathers, including Alexander Hamilton and James Madison, “believed that if American democracy were to die, it would be at the hands of a faction. The greatest threat to the republic […] was not an outside adversary but a homegrown group ravenous for control” (141). Today, these words are especially prophetic. This factionalism is rooted in identity groups, including race, religion, and geography. Division along these lines has been steadily growing in the US since the mid-1960s. However, social media and Trump severely amplified this division. During Trump’s presidency, the US fell to a score of 3 on the factionalism five-point scale. This fall concerns Walter since the US has only seen this level of political factionalism twice before: in the years preceding the US Civil War and during the Civil Rights Movement.

Third, the US is facing the dark consequences of the loss of status by a group previously in power. In this case, white Americans, who represent the sons of soil in the country, are facing unprecedented economic, demographic, political, and social challenges that are rocking their traditional hold on power. Walter pays specific attention to the growing urban-rural divide, which has become a key feature of far-right movements around the world, including Turkey and Thailand. Walter notes that “movements that are geographically concentrated and predominantly rural are more likely to mobilize violent resistance because it’s easier to recruit soldiers, collect funding, and evade police in areas far from the capital” (151). This situation is occurring in the US.

Finally, the last trigger for civil wars is present in the US: the loss of hope. Due to election losses and changing demographic, political, economic, and social factors, many white Americans are increasingly less hopeful that their future will be more prosperous. As a result, they are increasingly seeing violence as the only means to regain political power and protect their status. The increase in militias in the US corroborates this assertion.

While the US appears to be moving toward a civil war, Walter emphasizes that this does not have to be the conclusion, as there are tools to combat extremism. The most effective one is to reform an unstable government. Doing so shows citizens that the government serves them and that their political institutions are free, fair, and accountable. Effective governments, in turn, can combat the strategies extremist groups use to erode democracy. Walter remains hopeful that Americans will be able to rebuild their democracy using these strategies.