Determined: A Science of Life without Free Will

Sapolsky explores the common fear that a lack of belief in free will could cause antisocial behavior. He cites studies manipulating test subjects before testing various factors. Subjects primed for disbelief in free will have shown “less intentionality,” a weaker sense of agency, and increased antisocial behavior to a mild degree for a short time—“more amok-ish than amok” (250). To examine the impact of widespread disbelief in free will, Sapolsky discusses atheism versus the belief in moralizing gods. Such gods appeared in advancing civilizations with growing populations and were invoked to maintain social order. Atheism is stigmatized throughout the world, including in the US, where atheists experience more prejudice than any other social group. Atheists have been denied custody of their children, and they are less likely to be elected, with some states still having laws against atheists running for public office. In one experiment, psychologists sold shoes, sending out some in unmarked packages and others with the company name “Atheist Shoes.” Several of the labeled boxes went missing or were delayed because some postal workers did not want to process or deliver them. This prejudice occurs because atheists are seen as immoral.

While some studies have found that atheists demonstrate more antisocial behaviors than religious individuals, Sapolsky argues that these findings are misleading. Studies with these findings are often conducted as self-reporting surveys; observational studies that control for age, economic status, and sex show that there are no significant differences between atheist and theist pro-sociality. Further, both atheists and theists exhibit more pro-social behavior after being primed to consider religion. Theists and atheists demonstrate differing values, with religious and conservative individuals valuing purity, obedience, and loyalty and atheists and liberal people valuing harm avoidance and fairness. Thus, in examining morality between atheists and theists, findings are dependent on both the given prime and the targeted value. Sapolsky then shifts his focus from America, where atheists make up 5% of the population, to Scandinavian countries, which have much higher rates of atheism. Scandinavian countries have a higher quality of life and far less antisocial behaviors among their citizens: “[L]ower average rates of religiosity in a country predict lower levels of corruption, more tolerance of racial and ethnic minorities, higher literacy rates, lower rates of overall crime and homicide, and less frequent warfare” (261). However, it is hard to tell if higher quality of life results in low religiosity or vice versa.

Some studies have consistently found that religious individuals demonstrate higher sociability; however, this prosocial behavior is often directed only toward in-group members, and studies have shown that when given religious primes, theists show more antisocial behaviors toward out-group members. Sapolsky suggests that free will skepticism, like atheism, will not result in immoral or antisocial behavior. Neil Levy and Damien Crone conducted an experiment examining differences between those who do and do not believe in free will, and they found no difference in morality. Moral behavior is instead aligned with moral identity; those who feel defined by their morals demonstrate more ethical behavior. Those who hold strong views one way or another are more similar in their moral behavior than those who are undecided.

Sapolsky posits that minds change in response to their circumstances, and he uses neural and behavioral changes in sea slugs to exemplify the process. If the siphon of an Aplysia californica sea slug is touched, it retracts its gill for a time. If its tail is shocked a minute before its siphon is touched, it will retract its gill for twice the length of time. As the number of shocks increases, the length of time the gill is retracted also extends. Chemicals, which Sapolsky describes as “Stuff,” are released when the slug is shocked, and the “Stuff” amplifies the neurotransmitter in the sensor neuron, which senses when the siphon is touched. Sapolsky includes the technical findings of the study on the Aplysia, conducted by Eric Kandel, but he notes that it is not necessary to read it. This mechanistic process of behavior adjusting to stimuli also occurs in humans. He provides another example of neural conditioning through eye-blink conditioning, in which mammals learn to blink when they hear a tone because they expect a puff of air to get blown into their eye. The concept is the same as Pavlovian conditioning, named after the famous experiment in which Ivan Pavlov conditioned his dogs to drool when they heard a bell. As with the Aplysia experiment, eye-blink conditioning, and Pavlovian conditioning, the stimuli increase the neurotransmitter supply, which causes the altered behaviors. More complex examples of conditioning include studies showing that rat pups who are separated from their mothers while young grow up to have higher stress and anxiety levels, which makes it harder for them to be eye-blink conditioned. Sapolsky concludes that “early-life adversity impairs this circuit by making a key neuron in the circuit more sensitive to stress” (285).

The amygdala, which triggers stress and anxiety, is conditioned via the same processes, and it is impacted by a variety of factors that can enhance or impede conditioning. Sapolsky identifies several conditioned fear responses that have been pushed by sociopolitical interests, such as fears of certain groups, with the highlighted example of President Trump repeatedly encouraging a fear of Mexican immigrants. A person’s vulnerability to such conditioning is influenced by their biology and environment. Sapolsky presents an anecdote in which he is driving and sees a bumper sticker about performing random acts of kindness, and he subsequently decides to let a car move into the lane in front of him instead of blocking it. Sapolsky reiterates that such behaviors are a result of biology and experience rather than free will. Using hypothetical sets of neurons and their connections, Sapolsky demonstrates how neurons overlap to create emergently complex thoughts and change. He concludes by declaring, “We don’t choose to change, but it is abundantly possible for us to be changed, including for the better. Perhaps even by having read this chapter” (299).

Sapolsky argues that the benefits of free will skepticism can already be seen on a smaller scale. The first example is epilepsy. Before epilepsy was understood, its effects were attributed to nefarious causes such as demonic possession and witchcraft. Repeated seizures can result in brain damage, and seizures, rarely, can be followed by fits of violence that the person will not remember. People with epilepsy were often ostracized; they were banned from getting married and sterilized, and, in some places, pregnant women with epilepsy were killed. In the 1800s, medical science advanced, and the underlying causes of epileptic seizures came to light. Society no longer blamed people with epilepsy for their symptoms, and they were acquitted after committing violent acts caused by their conditions. Sapolsky argues that people who exhibit antisocial behaviors cannot control their behavior any more than people with epilepsy can control their seizures. While people with epilepsy are not to blame for their symptoms, they are still held accountable in ways such as having their driving licenses revoked. Sapolsky cites several situations in which people with epilepsy have driven when they were not supposed to and killed people; the decision each of them made to drive was, like all decisions, impacted by a slew of factors leaving no room for free will.

Next, Sapolsky addresses the shift in public attitude toward schizophrenia, a condition that results in disordered thinking and hallucinations. In the 1950s, medical professionals, influenced by Freud, blamed mothers for causing schizophrenia. Schizophrenia is a genetic “neurodevelopmental disorder” that is caused by a combination of genetics and a stressful early environment, such as being birthed via an emergency C-section, and it involves excessive and random bursts of dopamine and structural neurological differences. The attitude toward schizophrenia started shifting in the 1970s after a man with the disorder killed two people and a woman named Eleanor Owen gathered a group of others who had been impacted by schizophrenia to support the killer’s family. Several other groups formed, and they joined together to form the National Alliance on Mental Illness (NAMI). Dr. E. Fuller Torrey, a psychiatrist who had a sister with schizophrenia, connected with NAMI and acted as a spokesperson delivering the message that schizophrenia is a biological condition and is not caused by “schizophrenogenic mothering.” After Torrey appeared on television, NAMI received an influx of funding; although schizophrenia is still not fully understood, parents are no longer blamed for causing it. A similar progression occurred with autism, post-traumatic stress disorder, Gulf War syndrome, dyslexia, sexual orientation, and gender identity. Sapolsky concludes that his examples demonstrate that the world becomes better when people are not blamed for behaviors.