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Thomas PikettyA modern alternative to SparkNotes and CliffsNotes, SuperSummary offers high-quality Study Guides with detailed chapter summaries and analysis of major themes, characters, and more.
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Piketty asks, given its upward trajectory, will “the capital/income ratio… regain or even surpass past levels before the end of the twenty-first century” (204)? This leads to a related question: Why is there a lower structural capital/income ratio in the US, and what determines the long-run capital/income ratio? And is there an equilibrium for this?
To address this Piketty presents the second law of capitalism: In the long run, the capital/income ratio is equal to the rate of savings divided by growth. A nation that grows slowly and saves a lot will, in the long run, come to have a high capital/income ratio. In such a society wealth will come to have a disproportionate influence on society. This is why, Piketty argues, “Decreased growth—especially demographic growth—is thus responsible for capital’s comeback” (207).
This law explains why the capital/income ratio has returned to high levels again after the low of the 1950s caused by high economic and demographic growth. It also explains why the US has a lower capital/income ratio than Europe, due to higher demographic growth. Note, however, that this law is true only in the long term, as it takes many years on a national level for wealth to accumulate. This law, also does not explain and is independent of shocks like the 1929 crash and the world wars. Likewise, it is independent of fluctuations in speculative bubbles regarding the price of capital, such as the dotcom bubble in 2000-2001. Such bubbles can, in the short run, artificially exaggerate or underestimate the capital income ratio because of variations in the price of certain capital assets.
Given this law, three factors explain why since the 1970s the capital/income ratio in rich nations has increased from around 3:1 to one to between 4 and 7:1. These are: 1) slow growth, especially demographic growth; 2) a slightly higher rate of saving; and 3) the privatization of public assets and wealth in the 1970s and 80s and its transfer to private hands. Differences in these factors also explains differences in capital/income ratios across nations. For example, the US has both a higher growth rate, due to demographic growth, and a lower savings rate than Japan. As a result, the US has a much lower capital income ratio than Japan’s, which is around 7:1. Based on predictions of future growth rates, one a half percent per year in the second half of the 21st century and stabilization of saving levels around ten percent, Piketty’s second law of capitalism suggests that “by 2100, the entire planet could look like Europe at the turn of the 20th century, at least in terms of capital intensity” (245).
Piketty now moves from analysing the capital/income ratio to looking at the division between capital and labour in national income. To determine this, he looks back to what he called the first fundamental law of capitalism: The share of national income held by capital is equal to national income times by the rate of return on capital. Hence a critical question in determining the share of national income taken by capital, and the capital-labour split in the long-run, is “How is the rate of return on capital determined” (249)?
From a historical viewpoint, the pure return on capital (the return on capital minus the cost of entrepreneurial labour and managerial costs such as portfolio management) was between four and five percent in the 18th and 19th centuries. At present it is between three and four percent. What though causes this, and why does it differ over time and in different societies? According to classical economic theory the return on capital is determined by the “marginal productivity” (266) of capital. That is, the additional output yielded by an extra unit of capital. This marginal return typically has diminishing returns. In other words, a surplus of capital will, in any given area, reduce the marginal productivity of capital and the return an investor can hope to get for additional investment of capital.
However, Piketty writes, “In more complex models, which are also more realistic, the rate of return on capital also depend on the relative bargaining power of the various parties involved” (266). He also identifies, in relation to this, the two main functions of capital. These are first to provide housing and second to serve as a factor of production in producing other goods and services. Piketty also warns against the theory that “human capital” will be responsible for a long-run decrease in the in the capital/income ratio. Proponents of this claim often point to the increasing significance of technology and to the concomitant significance of skilled labour to use that technology. However, he argues, capital can also be significant in the creation of advanced technology. Further, an increase in skills can still be compatible with a high capital/income ratio so long as, as it seems still is the case, industrial, financial, and real estate capital remain useful.
The capital/income ratio, according to Piketty, is determined by the rate of saving divided by the rate of growth. He writes:
These two macrosocial parameters themselves depend on millions of individual decisions influenced by any number of social, economic, cultural, psychological, and demographic factors which vary considerably from period to period and country to country. (249)
As such, it may seem difficult to draw any concrete conclusions from Piketty’s “law.” The rate of saving, in any society at a given moment, for one, seems especially hard to predict. Piketty does observe that, “the countries that save the most are often those whose population is stagnant and aging” (217). This is because they may need to save more for their own retirement, rather than relying on support from children. Still, as he also says, “the relation is far from systematic” (217). And many other contingent, and shifting, cultural norms play a large role. Some cultures may regard saving as virtuous and debt shameful, whereas others may see immediate consumption as more important.
The same is true of population growth. Presently, the US population is growing, although the rate has been falling since the 1990s, from almost one point five percent to half a percent per year. Europe’s population growth is almost static, and Japan’s has been negative since 2010. There does seem to be a downward trend in the developed nations. Given the complexity of possible explanations, from global warming concerns to greater female participation in the workplace to more freedom in lifestyle choices, it seems hard to predict the future. What is more certain is that per capita economic growth is likely to slow. Indeed, economist Robert Gordon has predicted that the rate will be as low as zero-point five percent between 2050 and 2100. This is because any future waves of technological innovation will have smaller and smaller effects on the overall productivity of the economy.
At any rate, technological change is unlikely to provide long run growth of much greater than one percent. This is particularly true if the full costs of a warming environment and ecological degradation are factored in. As such, based on Piketty’s law, the capital/income ratio in the long run looks likely to grow. In fact, by 2100, it may even surpass the European historic high of 6 and 7:1 at the start of the 20th century. Nor is there any automatic economic mechanism to prevent this. As he says, “There is no natural force that inevitably reduces the importance of capital and of income flowing from ownership of capital over the course of history” (293). Even diminishing returns on capital will not achieve this because “the decrease in the rate of return will be smaller than the increase in the capital/income ratio” (293). In other words, any drop off from the return of capital will be more than compensated for by the greater quantity of capital yielding returns, meaning capital can still grow.
That said, there may be political factors limiting growth. More benignly, an excessive capital/income ratio may lead to democratic demands for reform. This could mean a reversal of the “privatization and transfer of public wealth into private hands” (215) that occurred in the 1970s and 1980s. It might mean a reaction against the neo-liberal consensus still dominant in the West. This could entail a return to greater regulation, taxation, and public ownership of overly dominant private wealth.
If calls for reform are ignored, however, revolutionary movements may step into the void. They may argue for the seizure of private capital rather than its reform. Likewise, extreme nationalism might re-emerge as a response. Such nationalism could also be encouraged by elites to fend off change. In these circumstances, combined with stress on resources caused by ecological crisis, conflicts between major powers may recur. Indeed, they may lead to a new global conflagration on a scale similar to previous world wars. In this case, new “shocks” will be created. These will thus have the effect of reducing the capital/income ratio in a more violent fashion.
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