54 pages • 1 hour read
Robert D. PutnamBowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community
Nonfiction | Book | Adult | Published in 2000A modern alternative to SparkNotes and CliffsNotes, SuperSummary offers high-quality Study Guides with detailed chapter summaries and analysis of major themes, characters, and more.
Themes
A Recurring Pattern of Social and Civil Disengagement
Across myriad spheres, Putnam identifies a recurring pattern of social and civil disengagement. Social and civil engagement increased quite rapidly after World War II, plateaued in the early 1960s, and then saw a sharp decline in the last third of the century, particularly in the mid-1980s. The types of activities have changed as well, with Americans less likely to engage in collective projects. Individualism has transformed into atomism and isolation. The decline in social and civic engagement has impacted every demographic group in American society, however, the decline has been the least severe for the long civic generation, or those born before the post-World War II baby boom.
Political participation has dramatically decreased, with voting down 25% since the 1950s. All forms of political participation, such as running for office, declined significantly from 1973 to 1994. Membership in voluntary organization increased steadily in the first two-thirds of the 20th century, then declined. In the mid-1970s, two-thirds of Americans attended club meetings while two-thirds never attended club meetings by the end of the 1990s. From 1973 to 1994, there was a 50% decrease in the number of people assuming leadership roles in organizations. Religion flourished in the first two-thirds of the 20th century while attendance and participation in religious institutions declined 25% from the mid-1970s to mid-1990s. The same pattern emerges in work-related organizations, with growth until the last one-third of the century. Membership in unions has dramatically decreased and the percentage of workers joining professional organizations has decreased as well. Americans are even interacting informally less often. In the 1970s, Americans entertained friends 14 or 15 times a year. By the late 1990s, that number was 8. As a percentage of income, charitable contributions declined as well in this period. Trust, which is critical to civil society, increased from the mid-1940s through the mid-1960s and then declined. In this case, almost all the change is due to generational replacement. However, in the other areas, generational replacement is an important factor in the explanation for the change, but not a comprehensive one. In select areas even those born before the baby boom have experienced declines in social capital.
Volunteering constitutes an exception to this pattern. However, the nature of that activity has changed. People are less likely to participate in a community project and favor individual acts, such as tutoring a child. This transition away from collective endeavors toward individual actions is also part of the recurring pattern of social and civil disengagement. In politics, for example, people are willing to write a letter but not to attend a town meeting. The new voluntary organizations require only a financial contribution from members and do not have local chapters where people attend face-to-face meetings. Increasingly, people are becoming spectators, not active participants at all. For example, people are more likely to watch, not play sports and to listen to, not make music. Putnam’s title provides another example. People are not willing to commit to a bowling league and therefore forfeit the socialization that accompanied that. Putnam concludes that by the end of the 20th century, the civic and social infrastructure has been hollowed out.
Generational Succession as a Primary Explanation for the Decline in Social Capital
Putnam attributes approximately half of the decline in social capital to generational succession. The long civic generation, or those born before the post-World War II baby boom, have bucked the trend of decline in some areas and experienced less severe rates of decline in other areas than those born after the war. The decline in social capital is sharpest for Generation X, the grandchildren of the long civic generation. Electronic entertainment, specifically television, coincided with the decline in social capital, and Putnam assigns one-quarter of the decline to television. Even that change has generational overtones as the long civic generation is the last one to grow up without television. However, television has influenced the habits of that generation as well. In other words, while generational succession is the primary explanation for the decline in social capital, it is not the only one. Part of the decline is the result of societal, not just generational, changes.
Putnam explains that very little of the decline in political participation is the result of individual changes, such as income, education, and age. The decline is instead the result of the Baby Boomers and Generation X gradually replacing the more active long civic generation. Likewise, the decline in religious attendance is attributed largely to generational differences. More people over the age of 60 are volunteering in the 1990s than were doing so in the 1970s. Although better health and more leisure time contribute to this outcome, the older generation’s commitment to community is another possible explanation. The decline in trust is almost entirely due to the attitudes of the Baby Boomers and Generation X; the long civic generation continues to have high levels of trust in the 1990s. To be sure, there are some areas in which the long civic generation has experienced declines in social capital. However, the decreases are not as sharp as for the younger generations. There has been an across-the-board decline in informal socialization or schmoozing, and Putnam sees television as the most significant culprit for this change because it keeps people at home and privatizes entertainment.
Importantly, these changes are not life cycles ones, which would not have impacted overall societal trends. Instead, Putnam explains the generational differences via referencing the unique socialization of each generation. The long civic generation experienced World War II and developed a sense of solidarity and trust for one another. Unlike the long civic generation, Baby Boomers and Generation X grew up with television. Baby Boomers experienced the divisive Vietnam War and came of age at a time when institutions were questioned, and individual rights celebrated. Generation X is also more individualist, cynical, and less trusting. As these two younger generations, with much lower levels of social capital, gradually replace the long civic generation, social capital declines.
The Consequences of Reduced Amounts of Social Capital
There are vast differences in communities, whether at the local, state, or national levels, with high and low levels of social capital. Societies with healthy levels of social capital are better for their inhabitants in several ways. Putnam explores five areas, namely education and child welfare, the health and productivity of neighborhoods, health and happiness, economic prosperity, and democratic citizenship. In each of these areas, Putnam documents the potential consequences of reduced amounts of social capital using secondary sources and studies and also survey data.
Communities with higher levels of social capital are less likely to have high rates of child abuse and more likely to have better educational outcomes. Informal social connections are especially important for children, as they enrich their leisure time and increase the number of caring adults in their lives. Crime rates are higher in areas with low amounts of social capital. In such areas, there is less trust in others, a fact which leads to a higher risk of conflict. Social capital bolsters an individual’s chance of economic success, but arguably also contributes to more prosperous neighborhoods. Housing values, for example, are higher in areas with low crime and strong educational systems. There is a strong relationship between health and social connectedness, with socially connected people less likely to experience disease and illness. Putnam explains that isolated people are less likely to receive help from neighbors and more likely to partake in self-destructive behaviors. Happiness increases with social connectedness as well. In times past, the elderly were most at risk of suicide. In the 1990s, young people are most at risk. The lack of social capital is part of the explanation for that. Most importantly, social capital sustains democracy by developing individual traits, such as communicative skills, and effective public policies.
In the absence of social capital, communities must rely on formal institutions and rules to function properly. Instead of trusting someone’s word, they must get a contract in writing. More money is therefore spent on legal fees, policing, and enforcement. Conflict is more likely. Indeed, Putnam notes that those from states with low levels of social capital are more likely to resort to violence. In short, the stakes for American individuals and society are high if social capital is not refurbished.
The Need to Rebuild Social Capital to Sustain Democracy
The most important benefit of social capital is a functioning democracy. De Tocqueville identified the critical role that social capital plays in the maintenance of democracy in 1835. The necessity of social capital for democracy remains a fact as it contributes to the development of democratic citizens, effective public policy, and governmental functioning. As a result, it is imperative that new forms of social capital, which are compatible with the values of younger generations, be created.
Social capital enables people to combine their voices and therefore to achieve political influence. Alone, people are politically powerless: If only one person objects to the installation of a nuclear waste dump in the neighborhood, that person will fail to stop it. That is why non-democratic societies seek to isolate individuals and create distrust. If anyone can be an informant, people learn to keep their thoughts to themselves and to keep their heads down. In contrast, democratic societies are open with people ideally leading vibrant associational lives. As more people withdraw from public life, extremists remain, and their voices gain more prominence. Politics thus becomes more confrontational, and governments are less able to craft workable compromises because there is less trust and more hostility toward one another.
Participation in associations, both formal and informal, cultivates civic virtues. Such active citizens are more likely to be tolerant of others and willing to accept compromise. They are more likely to agree on the ground rules of politics and accept the outcomes even when on the losing side. Additionally, government is more likely to be responsive and effective if the citizenry is active. Putnam argues that social capital strengthens, not weakens, the core American political values of liberty and equality.
Given this relationship between social capital and a healthy democracy, efforts must be made to refurbish social capital at the individual and institutional level. The social organizations built by the Progressives in the early 20th century no longer fit the values and habits of late 20th-century Americans. That might partly be due to the lingering effects of racism and sexism and partly to changes in habits. The challenge is to build new forms of social capital that conform to values in the late 20th century. Putnam offers suggestions, such as smaller schools, multi-use neighborhoods, and family-friendly policies, but he wants the younger generations to engage in this conversation and present ideas.
