Anarchy, State and Utopia

Independents and the Dominant Protective Agency

In Chapter 4, Nozick examines the dynamic between a dominant protective agency and individuals who choose to remain independent, enforcing their own rights. He contemplates a scenario in which independents exist within the geographical territory of the agency. As an example, Nozick speculates about Native Americans who could have refused to integrate into white settler society after being forced off their land.

Nozick theorizes that a protective agency might attempt to isolate independents, creating a territory with internal and external boundaries. However, this approach faces challenges if independents bypass these boundaries using advanced means, such as helicopters. He suggests that the protective agency might instead allow independents to enforce their rights, subsequently assessing and responding to any wrongful actions. This raises questions about action against independents, the legitimacy of the protective agency defending its clients against perceived threats, and the independence of the protective agency’s clients in the face of punitive actions by independents. Nozick’s questions reveal the moral complications inherent in a dominant protective association’s actions toward those who choose to operate outside its protective framework.

Prohibition and Compensation

In this section, Nozick explores the moral implications of crossing an individual’s natural rights boundary, as outlined by John Locke. Lock states that an individual has a rights boundary that others are bound to respect. Nozick questions whether actions violating this boundary are inherently forbidden or permissible with compensation. This inquiry leads to a discussion about the nature of compensation, such as what constitutes full compensation and how that is determined. Nozick tentatively suggests a compensation model that accounts for reasonable actions taken by the individual to mitigate their loss, placing the onus on the transgressor to compensate for the impact of their actions on a prudent person.

Why Ever Prohibit?

Further on, Nozick discusses the moral boundaries of personal consent and prohibition concerning individual rights. He posits that voluntary consent allows others to cross one’s moral boundaries, including actions impossible for one to do to oneself. He contrasts this with Locke’s idea that one cannot consent to others doing impermissible things to himself, such as assisted suicide. On the contrary, Nozick adopts a non-paternalistic stance, according to which individuals can consent to any action unless they have obligations to third parties.

Leaving behind the issue of assisted action, Nozick considers the following two opposing concerns: (1) why actions are prohibited rather than allowed with compensation for the victim and (2) why only some boundary crossings require prior consent. Regarding compensation, Nozick points to the complexity of verifying who the author of an act is.

Retributive and Deterrence Theories of Punishment

In this section, Nozick explores the moral and practical aspects of boundary crossing in the state of nature. He considers the risk and reward balance of crossing boundaries, incorporating factors like the probability of being apprehended and the costs of compensation and legal processes. He asserts that retributive theory, which focuses on deserved punishment for a crime, does not deter crime because it sets punishments either exceedingly high or very low. He contrasts this with utilitarian deterrence, which must balance the unhappiness caused by the punishment with that caused by the crime. Thus, in utilitarian theory, increasing punishment for the purpose of deterrence is not acceptable. Nozick notes this position as an anomaly.

In addition, Nozick suggests that considerations of “desert” might play a role in determining penalties. In the context of political theory, desert is used to signify a just punishment for a crime. The notion of desert is used by deterrence theorists, and Nozick suggests that it could be used to answer the utilitarian issue of measuring the unhappiness of victims and perpetrators. Nozick connects the discussion of deterrence to the issue of self-defense, considering the permissible extent of force in response to harm and the influence of the aggressor’s responsibility.

Dividing the Benefits of Exchange

Returning to the previous question of why not all boundary crossings are permissible if full compensation is paid, Nozick argues that such a system leads to an unfair and arbitrary allocation of benefits and goods. This system allows anyone to seize a good and claim ownership if they compensate the previous owner, which could result in unfair advantages for those who act first. It also raises issues about determining fair compensation, especially in a market where prices are influenced by demand. Nozick suggests that allowing negotiations to determine prices is fairer than any hypothetical compensation system.

Fear and Prohibition

Further exploring the prohibition of actions that can be compensated, Nozick focuses on the fear and apprehension that such acts may cause. He explains that certain acts, even if compensated, provoke fear, making them public wrongs. Nozick distinguishes between private wrongs, which only necessitate compensating the direct victim, and public wrongs, which create general fear among potential victims.

Nozick argues that a system allowing fear-inducing acts, even with compensation, would lead to general fear. Such fear is not eliminated by compensation, and this justifies prohibiting such acts. He also considers the complexity of fair compensation and the psychological impact of potential harm, noting that fear can persist despite the assurance of compensation. The section concludes by questioning whether the fear of certain acts is an inherent human response or a product of social conditioning.

Why Not Always Prohibit?

Taking the argument in the previous section further, Nozick focuses on the issues regarding boundary-crossing acts that produce fear and retribution against these acts. He asks the following: If certain acts are prohibited even when compensated, then how far should prohibition of boundary-crossing acts be taken? Nozick references cases in which obtaining consent from a victim is either impossible or prohibitively costly, such as accidental or unintentional acts. He suggests that acts yielding significant benefits might be permissible without prior consent if the cost of negotiating consent exceeds the cost of compensation after the act. The efficiency of this policy would depend on it allowing the greatest number of net beneficial acts.

However, Nozick acknowledges the difficulty in establishing a clear principle for determining when the benefits of an act justify its unconsented execution. The considerations of fear, the fair division of exchange benefits, and transaction costs collectively define the framework for this deliberation, but they do not provide a detailed solution for every scenario.

Risk

Nozick’s discussion in this section revolves around the complexities of risky actions that might not cause harm or fear on an individual basis but could result in significant harm collectively. He explores the difficulty of assigning responsibility for fear caused by a totality of such acts, as no single action is sufficiently harmful to warrant apprehension. While it might be overly strict to ban every component act of this totality, deciding which subsets to permit presents a challenge, especially without a central decision-making body.

Nozick suggests that actions posing slight risks of harm might be permissible—provided compensation is offered—in situations where obtaining prior consent is impossible or too costly. This approach aims for efficiency but struggles with fairness and the immense transaction costs involved. He considers alternatives like risk pools but argues that they carry their own issues of minor constant unfairness and major injustices, especially in cases involving risks of death.

The Principle of Compensation

Nozick discusses the issue of allowing an act with compensation in situations such as lack of funds or insurance to pay the compensation. He argues that in a society prioritizing liberty, prohibiting risky actions due to financial coverage concerns limits individual freedom, even if no harm occurs. For example, forbidding an epileptic individual to drive may not actually reduce harm overall. Prohibiting someone from a major life activity, like driving, imposes disadvantages on that person. However, compensating everyone restricted is unmanageable.

Further on, Nozick addresses pollution, which has a significant negative effect on others. A society must decide which polluting activities to allow, weighing benefits against costs. The beneficiaries of the polluting activities (such as companies) may be required to pay those negatively impacted. However, tackling pollution often involves complex legal and administrative challenges, especially when individual pollutants have minor but collectively significant effects. Overall, Nozick notes that the principle of compensation for prohibited actions due to risk imposition needs further refinement, particularly in how it handles the classification of actions and the determination of what constitutes a significant disadvantage.

Productive Exchange

Nozick compares a productive activity—purchasing a good or service that benefits both parties—to paying a perpetrator to abstain from a harmful act, which only benefits the perpetrator. Nozick notes that unproductive exchanges only offer relief from a potential threat. The concept of compensation in such scenarios is limited, with the payer only paying for the prevention of actual disadvantages. This approach differs from standard compensation of boundary-crossing acts because it does not always restore the disadvantaged person to their original position. The principle of compensation suggests that the potential perpetrators who are prohibited from conducting risky activities should be compensated, but Nozick does not pursue further argumentation.