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Pauline MaierA modern alternative to SparkNotes and CliffsNotes, SuperSummary offers high-quality Study Guides with detailed chapter summaries and analysis of major themes, characters, and more.
The story begins with Massachusetts delegates, Samuel Adams and John Hancock, traveling to Philadelphia to join Congress for its first meeting, scheduled to take place on May 10, 1775. In the time between the First Continental Congress adjourning in October 1774 and the Second Continental Congress assembling in May 1775, popular sentiment coalesced around a rejection of British tyranny. The catalyst for this change was the British troops’ attacks on Lexington and Concord in Massachusetts. Delegates from the other colonies united in support of Massachusetts. Not all of them, however, were prepared to consider the issue of Independence—self-defense was the foundation of Congress’s justification for fighting the British.
1. Congress
Many delegates hoped to reconcile with Great Britain, but the Second Continental Congress rejected such a reconciliation. Instead, the Congress voted to amass armed forces and take on the responsibilities of a wartime government. Congress’s duties extended beyond the war to practical issues affecting different colonies, making it the first national American government. Congress’s responsibilities were many and so varied that Congress developed an efficiency problem: The division of labor was convoluted and burdensome, and delegates couldn’t propose a policy or resolution until they had ascertained that the entire Congress would unanimously approve it. Maier says this tactic was logical, for “against the power of Britain, colonial strength lay in colonial unity. But it gave an obstructionist power to timid or recalcitrant minorities that continually irritated those who were—or were confident they ought to be—in the majority” (17). John Adams was one of those irritated delegates, but even he understood the colonies weren’t prepared for independence yet. Visionaries like him had to wait for more conservative compatriots to catch up.
2. Independence?
During the first month in which the Second Continental Congress met, the question of independence had to give way to pressing matters concerning the war and basic governance. In the first week, John Rutledge of South Carolina wanted to know what the aim of Congress would be: separation from or reconciliation with Great Britain. For some time, reconciliation was the professed aim; Pennsylvania’s John Dickinson and Virginia’s Thomas Jefferson were two prominent delegates who drafted documents expressing this aim. The Declaration on Taking Up Arms—drafted by Jefferson and revised by Dickinson—was one of many Congressional documents that followed the same structure: It described Britain’s offenses against the rights of the colonists, who were British citizens; it explained that they wanted reconciliation, not independence; and it promised they would end their forceful resistance when Britain ended its oppressions. There was disagreement among colonists on how to achieve reconciliation, but most agreed that they wanted to remain the King’s loyal British subjects and that they didn’t want Parliament governing them.
Parliament wouldn’t compromise on a division of powers—the majority of its members proclaimed that the only way the colonists could maintain their status as British subjects was to submit completely to Parliament’s rule, and George III agreed.
Congress decided, not for the first time, to send a petition directly to the King. Radicals disliked the idea of pleading with their tyrant for the restoration of their rights, but they agreed to it in the hope that its failure would persuade moderates to accept “more extreme measures” (24). The King’s Secretary for the American Colonies, Lord Dartmouth, accepted the petition and promised Congress’s messengers that it would reach George III; when Congress’s messengers asked Dartmouth for the King’s response, he reported that the King wouldn’t “formally receive the petition on the throne” and wouldn’t respond to it (25).
George III voiced his opinion in an address to Parliament: He believed the colonists were rebelling because their true objective was Independence, and he announced his willingness to accept foreign aid to crush the rebellion. A majority of Parliament agreed with the King and passed the Prohibitory Act to destroy the colonies’ economy, remove Britain’s protection of the colonies, and permit the seizure of American ships at sea. The act “essentially ratified and extended a policy already in effect” (26), to which colonists in Maine and Virginia could attest. Thomas Jefferson was convinced of the King’s animosity before news of the King’s speech arrived in January 1776. In February, colonists learned of the Prohibitory Act, which John Adams believed was the final straw for them—it was forcing them to Independence. Still, there was hesitance among some Congressional delegates, who claimed they wanted to postpone action until they knew the will of their constituents.
3. Common Sense
There were a variety of reasons colonists couldn’t decide on Independence: Some were simply Loyalists who supported the King on ideological grounds, while others feared losing Britain’s protection or their British national identity. British identity wasn’t limited to religion, language, or family histories—it also included “Britain’s unwritten constitution,” which offered greater protection of individual rights than could be found in other European monarchies. The colonists’ resistance, according to conservatives like John Dickinson, was a truly British response to their government’s unconstitutional actions; the situation didn’t warrant separation from Great Britain.
A common Englishman named Thomas Paine, who arrived in the colonies in 1774, wrote the pamphlet Common Sense—published anonymously in January 1776—and changed how colonists viewed Britain’s constitution and their own Britishness. Paine claimed that “monarchy and hereditary rule” were errors in an imperfect constitution, and these two errors caused the colonists’ problem with Britain’s government: “The only way to solve that problem was to redesign the machine of government, eliminating monarchy and hereditary rule and expanding the ‘republican’ element of British government which derived power not from birth but from the ballot” (31-32). He wrote that colonists feared Independence because they thought too well of the British government and they didn’t know what might replace the old system, so he suggested an alternative, a representative republic; however, he wished Americans would decide how to structure their republic “through debate and experimentation” (32).
Paine’s pamphlet was well-timed, bolstered by public outrage at George III’s speech to Parliament. Paine’s arguments about Independence weren’t new to Congress, but Common Sense “gathered those arguments together and used them not to persuade Congress, […] but the people whose support Congress needed” (33). Common Sense influenced public discourse by moving readers’ focus away from reconciliation with Britain and toward a vision of an independent American government (34).
4. A Republic?
Independence gained more support in Congress, but it had to consider the country’s future before it separated from Great Britain: What kind of nation would the colonies form? Undecided delegates worried about the effectiveness of a republican government, since all past republics didn’t last and proved chaotic when they existed. John Adams blamed “the Reluctance of the Southern Colonies to Republican Government” for the lagging pace toward Independence (35). The delegates had good reasons to fear Independence, chief among which was the threat of war between and within the colonies. Delay, however, was also a threat because it destabilized existing provincial governments with Loyalists who refused to fulfill their duties; this meant that new constitutional governments were needed, but they wouldn’t have great legal authority. Congress proposed a resolution backing the establishment of new governments wherever necessary. Adams drafted the resolution’s preface, in which he informed colonists of the misdeeds of Great Britain and explained why reconciliation was impossible, and he concluded that the colonists must suppress Britain’s authority while they created their own government.
Congress approved the preface after two days of debate, and with a split vote, on May 15. For the first time, Congress openly blamed their misfortunes on the King rather than on Parliament and the King’s advisers—but there was precedent for their reasoning in English political history (38). Colonists were most appalled by the King’s hiring of foreigners to help British troops subdue them. The failure to secure Canadian towns as a defensive measure added to the fear in American minds. The need for enlisting foreign aid was apparent, but naysayers expressed doubts about petitioning France, Britain’s Catholic enemy. Then the King made a statement that pushed the hesitant in Congress to change their minds on Independence: A City of London petition asked George III what the colonists could do to bring peace before he unleashed British armed forces in the colonies, and George answered that force was the only method he’d use to subjugate the “rebels” (40). The statement in turn convinced the holdouts that reconciliation was impossible. One of those holdouts, Pennsylvania delegate Robert Morris, acknowledged the truth on June 5, and he blamed Great Britain for Congress’s inevitable adoption of Independence.
5. Decision
During a busy Congressional conference on June 7, Richard Henry Lee moved for resolutions that the Virginia Convention had instructed him to address; John Adams seconded the motion. The resolutions were 1) The colonies should proclaim Independence; 2) Congress should work quickly to court foreign allies; 3) Congress must devise “a plan of confederation” and share it with every colony (41). Although the motion was well received, skeptics urged delay—they didn’t hear the people clamoring for independence, and they weren’t authorized by their respective local governments to vote for it. Other variables caused concern, which led to a postponement of the vote and then more debate. There was particular concern about which side France would support.
George Wythe of Virginia argued in favor of voting immediately for Independence because no European power would aid them unless Congress officially separated from Great Britain. He even suggested Congress stop trying to reach consensus; only two colonies’ governments posed problems, and their constituents wanted Independence already. Wythe didn’t win the argument, and there was a three-week pause before debating Independence again. In the meantime, Congress appointed a committee to draft a declaration, the war escalated with the arrival of British fleets near New York harbor, and Charleston, South Carolina, and the reluctant colonies grew more ready to accept Independence. Congress debated Lee’s resolution again on July 1, but they postponed a vote until July 2; on that day, Congress voted for Independence. Over the next two days, Congress revised the draft declaration as British forces arrived in greater numbers.
Maier uses a nonlinear structure to portray the contrast between Congress’s united support for Massachusetts and the political drama that ensues as the colonies edge closer to open rebellion. Both sides of the Independence question, for and against, had to debate regularly while Great Britain escalated the conflict. This part of Maier’s narrative, the back-and-forth between desperate Congressmen and a belligerent British government, takes the form of a comedy of errors with very high stakes. It hints at The British Roots of the Declaration of Independence, as the colonists draw from England’s 1689 Declaration of Rights in arguing that King George III violated the people’s rights and thus forfeited his right to rule over them.
A challenge of historical narrative is that readers already know, in broad strokes, how events turn out. This retrospective knowledge can make it difficult to convey the uncertainty that participants experienced. When Maier tells the story of the communications between British authorities and Congress, she’s aware that readers know what will eventually occur—consensus on Independence—so she focuses on showing how complicated and emotional the journey toward consensus was for delegates who loved being British subjects. Initially, many of the delegates who protested Britain’s economic and martial attacks did so out of a wish for reconciliation rather than rebellion. However, Maier makes clear that no matter how vocally these delegates professed their wish for peace, the King and most of Parliament insisted that they were rebels bent on overthrowing British rule. Maier emphasizes John Adams’s impatience with these opponents of Independence. Adams knew Independence was inevitable, and his responses to those who could not see this inevitability provide tension in the narrative.
The cause of Independence received extra help from two Englishmen, Thomas Paine and, ironically, King George III. Paine’s Common Sense was the push the public needed to accept Independence, because Paine offered an alternative to the government that was abusing them. George III provided more powerful incentives for Congress to separate from Britain. First, he and Parliament rejected Congress’s entreaties and passed the Prohibitory Act, to which Congress responded in keeping with English political tradition, with a formal accusation—drafted by Adams—that the King had abused his power: “To attack the King was […] a constitutional form. It was the way Englishmen announced revolution” (38). This statement forms a key part of Maier’s thesis about The British Roots of the Declaration of Independence: Even in “announc[ing] revolution” against the British crown, the colonists adopted a British “constitutional form.” The making of America was a British political act. Second, the King told petitioners in the City of London that he wanted to subdue the “rebels” by force. The reluctant delegates in Congress couldn’t deny the obvious, that reconciliation with Britain was impossible, so Congress reached a consensus on Independence on July 2. In the background, the committee for drafting a declaration completed the work, which means that Maier’s narrative must move its focus to the making of the Declaration of Independence.